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The topic chosen for this thesis was hedge funds. The hedge fund industry has grown 
tremendously the last decades, and the research in this field is still at an early stage. We 
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Koekebakker for constructive feedback, and also each other for good cooperation.  
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Abstract 
In this thesis we have examined the characteristics and performance of hedge funds. This is 
done in light of the expected liberalisation of hedge fund regulations in Norway. Our analysis 
is mainly of foreign hedge fund indices, but also of a few individual Norwegian hedge funds 
for a shorter period. 
 
Hedge funds are known for superior mean-variance characteristics. At first glance they do 
indeed appear attractive. However, when taking into account the often disregarded higher 
moments of the return distribution, characteristics of negative skewness and positive excess 
kurtosis are revealed. This should be taken into consideration when evaluating hedge fund 
performance, since it indicates extreme values of return. It is noteworthy though, that in the 
shorter period of our analysis, these characteristics have been reduced considerably.  
 
The objective of hedge funds is positive return regardless of market movements, and they 
could therefore serve well for portfolio diversification purposes. Our studies reveal a low to 
moderate correlation with traditional assets, and it seems to be lower in bear markets. Our 
observations also tell us that hedge funds are sensitive to extreme market conditions.  
 
Autocorrelation can cause undervaluation of the volatility of hedge fund returns. The presence 
of first order autocorrelation among some hedge fund strategies is evident. Consequently, we 
found overestimation of risk-adjusted performance measures, and it also affected correlation. 
Among individual Norwegian hedge funds, autocorrelation seems absent. 
 
Literature on hedge funds often focuses on the limitations of traditional performance 
measures. Using both traditional and innovative performance measures we find that hedge 
funds, in spite of their characteristics, are ranked higher than traditional asset classes. We also 
find that the performance ranking of the traditional and innovative measures do not differ 
considerable from each other.  
 
However, there are several aspects of consideration when analyzing hedge funds. One of the 
major limitations of the research in this field is caused by the hedge funds’ complex nature 
and lack of transparency. The absence of reliable and accurate data makes it difficult to draw 
definite conclusions.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem Definition 
Hedge funds’ popularity has increased considerably in the recent years. A reason for this is 
that they are known to provide better mean-variance characteristics as compared to traditional 
assets.  
 
So far, it has been prohibited by law to establish and advertise hedge funds in Norway. 
Companies have been forced abroad to set up these types of funds. A new proposal made by 
the Ministry of Finance suggests a liberalization of the restrictive investment regulations of 
hedge funds. This will make hedge funds more available to investors in Norway.  
 
In light of this we wish to take a closer look at the characteristics and performance of hedge 
funds. Are hedge funds’ risk-return relationship as attractive as advertised? Do they serve 
well for diversification? Do hedge funds outperform traditional asset classes? We will try to 
find answers to these questions by analyzing the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index 
and individual Norwegian hedge funds registered at the Nordic Hedge Fund Index. The funds 
defined as Norwegian are those with Norwegian managers.  
 
The amount and history of Norwegian Hedge funds are limited. Our focus will therefore 
primarily be on the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index. We will evaluate a small 
sample of Norwegian hedge funds against the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index.  
 
We will start by looking at the statistical properties of the hedge funds’ returns. Since hedge 
funds focus on absolute return, we will measure the hedge funds’ correlation with various 
market indices.   
 
Traditional performance measures are regarded as inadequate for analyzing hedge fund 
returns. We will therefore apply some innovative measures, which take into account the 
characteristics of hedge fund returns. The hedge funds will be ranked according to these 
measures, and Spearman’s rank correlation will be used to observe the ranking between the 
measures. Since autocorrelation of return series may underestimate volatility of hedge funds, 
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we will adjust the returns for first order autocorrelation to investigate if this affects the 
observed performance and the correlation with other assets.  
 
1.2. Structure of Thesis 
This thesis consists of three main parts:  
  
1. The first part is theoretical and consists of chapter 2 to 7. We start by giving a short 
presentation of hedge funds. We will then take a closer look at statistical properties of 
return and modern portfolio theory before we discuss various performance measures. The 
first part is rounded off with a presentation of hedge funds as well as biases in hedge fund 
databases. 
 
2. In the second part, consisting of chapter 8 to 11, we start by giving a description of the 
data used in our analysis. This is followed up by our empirical analysis.  
 
3. The last part starts with chapter 12, where we discuss possible sources of hedge fund 
performance as well as limitations. The thesis is finalized in chapter 13 with the 
conclusion of our major findings. 
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2.0 An Introduction to Hedge Funds 
Alfred Winslow Jones is usually acknowledged as the creator of the first hedge fund in 1949. 
However, Lhabitant (2006) claims that there are earlier evidences of hedge fund writings. The 
first appears to be the book Scientific Forecasting, which was published in 1931 by Karl 
Karsten. Here, most of the key principles of managing a hedge fund are summarized. Karsten 
created a small fund in 1930, but he was primarily interested in testing his theories, not in 
profits.  
 
2.1 History 
Alfred W. Jones created a fund which primarily invested in common stocks. It was based on 
two assumptions: that he could identify stocks that were overvalued or undervalued, and that 
market changes could not be foreseen. Anchored in these assumptions, his strategy was to 
combine long positions in undervalued stocks and short positions in overvalued stocks. The 
positions were larger than the fund’s capital by the use of leverage; Jones financed the 
purchase of long positions with the income from the short sales. This was the first time short 
sale and leverage were combined as investment tools. In order to attract investors, Jones 
charged performance-linked fees of 20 percent of realized profits instead of asset-based 
management fees. According to Brown and Goetzmann (2003) Carol Loomis was the first 
person to use the term “hedge fund” in a Fortune magazine article written in 1966. She 
discussed Jones’ fund structure and investment strategy. Until the article was published, Jones 
had been running his fund in secrecy with hardly any changes in the approach, but then 
interest in hedge funds and creation of new ones rapidly increased. The number of hedge 
funds has soared, particularly since the early 1990s. According to Lhabitant (2004), there 
were only 68 hedge funds in 1984, while estimates suggest that there are now over 6000 
hedge funds managing around $600 billion in assets.  
 
2.2 Why Hedge Funds? 
McCrary (2005) lists three main reasons for why investors should invest in hedge funds: to 
increase return, to reduce risk and to increase diversification. 
Hedge funds have generally shown a much better risk/return relationship than other assets, at 
least when only mean and variance is considered. Hedge funds also have a historically low 
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correlation to the stock and bond markets due to the focus on absolute return. This gives the 
investors the benefit of diversification. 
Other characteristics of hedge funds that attract investors are:  
 Hedge fund managers have a low degree of restrictions in their asset management. This 
improves the possibility of superior returns.  
 Managers invest their own money in the funds. This gives confidence, and aligns the 
interests of investors and managers. 
 Because of their favourable fee structure, the hedge fund industry attracts some of the best 
fund managers.  
These features will be described in depth later on.  
 
2.3 The Legal Environment in Norway 
So far it has been illegal to establish and advertise hedge funds in Norway. Norway is one of 
the few countries with such restrictive regulations of these types of securities. Still, some 
Norwegian fund managers register hedge funds abroad and sell them in Norway. Hedge fund 
managers are not obliged to report their figures. These issues make it difficult to obtain an 
overview of the “Norwegian” hedge fund universe. It can be argued that the prohibition of 
advertisement and establishment of hedge funds are inconsistent with the fact that they can be 
sold in Norway. However, March 14th 2008 the Ministry of Finance made a proposal for a 
change in the law concerning securities (“verdipapirfondloven”). Hedge funds are introduced 
as a subcategory of security funds, and establishment and marketing of hedge funds in 
Norway will be possible. Hedge funds are given broad access to use various financial 
vehicles, but the requirements for reporting strategies and risk are sharpened. They will have 
to send periodical reports to investors as well as the governments. The law also specifies that 
hedge funds only can be sold to the public after advice from an authorized investment advisor. 
This is not required for selling to professional investors. The proposal will be voted for in the 
Parliament, and if accepted implemented at January 1st 2009.  
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3.0 Statistical Properties of Hedge Fund Returns  
In this chapter we will present some statistical properties of hedge fund returns. First we will 
look at the centralized moments and its properties, as well as the possible disturbance of 
outliers. Correlation will also be briefly presented, and the presence of autocorrelation in 
hedge fund returns.  
 
3.1 Return 
Early work on return has been on statistical behaviour of net asset value or prices. Recent 
work in finance concerns time series of return. According to Lhabitant (2004), the reason for 
this shift is that returns standardize the evolution of a price by considering price per unit of 
risk. The statistical properties of returns are also more appealing than prices. 
 
According to the timeline: 
 
the realized return on a given asset is defined as: 
 
1
1
−
−
−
=
n
nn
n S
SS
r            (3.1) 
where n = 1,2,…,N, 
        nS  = the given asset’s value at time n and 
         nr  = the realized return on a given asset at time n. 
 
 3.2 The Return Distribution and its Centralized Moments 
The nth central moment around the mean (or expected return) is defined as [ ]nn rErE )(( −=µ , 
where E represents the expectation. Even moments give us the probability of extreme values, 
while odd moments tell us about the symmetry of the distribution. The mean and variance are 
called the first and second central moment about the mean. Mean, the expected return, 
represents the reward. The variance and higher moments represent the uncertainty related to 
S0 S1 SN 
  
  Timeline  S2                     ,…,                 
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the reward. Usually, only the two first moments are used. In this thesis we will consider four 
moments of the central distribution. The two first are the already mentioned mean and 
variance. The third and fourth is skewness and kurtosis. 
 
3.2.1 The Mean – The First Central Moment 
The mean, the first moment of a distribution, is the expected return: 
 
rr
N
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n
n === ∑
=1
1)(µ         (3.2) 
 
The first central moment about the mean of a distribution is defined as: 
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)(1                   (3.3) 
 
The first central moment about the mean is always zero, and consequently usually of no 
interest. 
 
3.2.1.1 Arithmetic versus Geometric Mean 
The first moment, the mean, can be calculated using either the arithmetic or geometric mean. 
The arithmetic mean, presented in equation 3.2, is often preferred among fund managers. This 
is partly because it is less complicated to calculate and partly because it yields higher values, 
making investment appear better. The arithmetic mean is always higher than the geometric. 
This is because the geometric mean return also accounts for the consequence of 
compounding. They are only equal if there is no variation in yearly returns. Geometric mean 
is defined as: 
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The method to use depends upon the number of periods needed to be measured as well as the 
desire for accurate calculations. When we want to calculate the mean of many sub-periods, 
the geometric mean may be preferred since it accounts for compounding. The geometric mean 
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is also a better measure of past performance, while arithmetic mean is often preferred when 
predicting future performance. 
 
3.2.2 The Variance – The Second Central Moment 
The variance or the standard deviation is the most common measure of risk. The variance is 
the average squared deviation from the mean return. It is also called the second central 
moment around the mean, and is given by: 
 
[ ]22 )(( rErEVariance −== µ ∑
=
−=
N
n
n rrN 1
2)(1 = 2σ     (3.5) 
 
Since the units of variance are different from the units of return, it is necessary to transform 
them into a common unit. This is done by taking the square root of the variance. This measure 
is called the standard deviation and is often referred to as the volatility:  
 
Standard Deviation= σ=−∑
=
N
n
n rrN 1
2)(1       (3.6) 
 
3.2.3 Skewness – The Third Central Moment 
The third moment divided by the standard deviation is called skewness. It is the cubed 
deviation from the mean. Variance only tells us how large the deviation from the expected 
return is, while skewness is a measure of the symmetry of the distribution. If skewness is 
positive the distribution has a longer positive tail. This means rather small losses but larger 
gains. The opposite is true if skewness is negative, and this is a usually undesirable situation 
with many small gains and larger losses. Skewness is given by: 
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3.2.4 Kurtosis – The Fourth Central Moment 
The fourth moment, kurtosis, measures the degree of peakedness and give us the 
characteristics of the tails of the distribution. In other words, it measures the probability of 
extreme values. The kurtosis is calculates as follows: 
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The excess kurtosis is calculated by subtracting 3: 
 
Excess kurtosis = 34 −µ         (3.9) 
 
The normal distribution obtains a kurtosis of 3. Excess kurtosis is therefore for simplicity 
calculated to make this value zero. When the excess kurtosis is positive it is called 
“leptokurtic”. It is then characterized by a distribution with fat tails and peakedness. More of 
the expected return is located around the mean, but it also has a higher probability of extreme 
values as compared to a normal distribution. When the excess kurtosis is negative, the shape 
of the distribution curve is called “platykurtic”. The peak is softer and the tails have 
“shoulders”. As opposite to a “leptokurtic”, the “platykurtic” distribution has a lower 
probability of extreme values and fewer values located closer to the mean than a normal 
distribution. 
 
3.2.5 Hedge Funds and the Normal Distribution 
One way of achieving an overall view of the return of an asset is to present it in a relative 
frequency histogram. This is done by calculating the frequency of different intervals of 
returns. This enables us to study the shape of the return distribution. Modern Portfolio Theory 
assumes assets’ returns to be normally distributed. The normal distribution (also known as the 
Gaussian distribution) is a bell-shaped symmetric curve. It is fully described by its mean and 
standard deviation, and is practical since it is easy to understand and use when analyzing 
return. 
 
The standard deviation is a powerful and accurate measure of risk, but only if the return 
distribution is normal. Two investments may have the same mean and standard deviation, but 
differ significantly in terms of higher moments. Observations made of the financial markets 
(see for instance Brooks and Kat (2002)) reveal that most return distributions deviate from the 
normal distribution, and it is known that hedge fund return seldom is normally distributed. 
This is to due to the use of derivatives and other characteristics of hedge funds, which 
separate them from other traditional investment funds. According to Schmidhuber and Moix 
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(2001), hedge funds commonly reveal a hyperbolic return distribution with a negative 
skewness and a positive excess kurtosis. 
 
The Normal Distribution
 
Figure 1: The Normal Distribution 
 
3.2.6 Normality Test of the Return Distribution 
There are several ways to test if the return of an asset is normally distributed. A well-known 
method is the Jarque-Bera test. It tests the null hypothesis that a series of return of an asset is 
normally distributed, based on the fact that skewness and excess kurtosis in a normal 
distribution is close to zero. The Jarque-Bera test is given by: 
 

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+=−
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2
2 KurtosisExcessSkewnessNBeraJarque     (3.10) 
 
The Jarque-Bera statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom. If 
the value of the test is higher than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. If the data 
set is rather small, the Jarque-Bera test for normality should be used with caution, since it is 
asymptotic (Lhabitant 2006). 
 
3.3 Outliers 
Returns that are considered to be outliers often occur in finance, and particularly with hedge 
funds. Lhabitant (2004) describes outliers as returns that depart distinctly from the pattern of 
 Mean Return 
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the majority of the returns. No clear boundaries define outliers, but they are generally unusual 
large or unusual small values compared to the others.  
 
There are two reasons for outliers. They may either be the result of either an error in 
measurement or of a genuine structural property of the data. If they are due to the first reason, 
the outliers will distort the interpretation of the data. The outliers can therefore be safely 
removed from the data set. If they are due to the latter reason, the outliers are important 
because they indicate extreme behaviour. These outliers should not be removed without 
further justification. 
 
3.4 Correlation 
One of the benefits of hedge funds is that they focus on absolute return. The managers of 
hedge funds aim at a positive return independently of the market environment. Lhabitant 
(2004) finds that hedge funds have shown a low to medium correlation with traditional assets 
like equities and bonds.   
 
There are several methods to measure the correlation between two assets. Two well 
recognized methods are the Pearson’s product-moment correlation and Spearman’s rank 
correlation. The Pearson correlation assumes that the samples are from a population which is 
normally distributed. This assumption is particularly important in small samples, since 
outliers can disturb the measurement of the correlation coefficient. Due to this problem, the 
Pearson’s correlation is sometimes replaced by the Spearman’s rank correlation, which is less 
sensitive to outliers. Spearman’s rank correlation is a non-parametric measure of correlation. 
The data is converted to rankings before measuring the correlation coefficient. The correlation 
coefficient is calculated as follows: 
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where N = the number of rankings and 
        
2
nd  = the n
th
 squared difference of the ranking. 
 
Spearman’s rank correlation can obtain a value between -1 and 1, where a positive correlation 
indicates that the ranks of both variables increase or decrease together. A negative correlation 
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implies that as the ranks of one variable decrease, the other will increase. If the correlation is 
close to zero, the rankings of the variables obtain no linear relationship.  
 
3.5 Autocorrelation 
Hedge funds often take positions in illiquid securities. This leads to serial correlation in the 
return series, since market prices may not be available. This makes mark to market difficult, 
and the last available price or estimates are often used. Brooks and Kat (2002) document 
highly significant autocorrelation in returns of hedge fund indices. According to Getmansky et 
al. (2003), reported returns for portfolios of illiquid securities tend to be smoother than true 
returns. This will understate volatility and overestimate risk-adjusted performance measures. 
They show that the most likely reason for serial correlation is illiquidity exposure.  
 
The Ljung-Box test is a well-known test for autocorrelation. It is defined as follows: 
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where n = the number of observations, 
τk= the autocorrelation coefficient at lag k and 
m = the number of lags being tested. 
 
The Ljung-Box statistics follows a chi-square distribution with m degrees of freedom under 
the null hypothesis that the data is random. 
 
3.5.1 Adjusting Returns for Autocorrelation 
Geltner (1993) discuss methodologies to unsmooth returns of infrequent valuation of 
properties in real estate. Following this, Brooks and Kat (2002) derived a method to unsmooth 
return series with first order autocorrelation. The observed smoothed return of a hedge fund 
index at time n can be defined as the weighted average of the true return at time n and the 
observed smoothed return at time n-1: 
 
*
1
* )1(
−
−+== nnn rrrreturnSmoothed λλ        (3.13) 
where  *nr  = the observed smoothed return of an index at time n, 
          nrλ  = the true (unobservable) underlying value of an index at time n and 
*
1)1( −− nrλ  = the observed smoothed return of an index at time n-1.  
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The following equation can then be used to unsmooth the return series: 
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rretunUnsmoothed        (3.14) 
where λ  = the first order autocorrelation coefficient of an index, 
          nr  = the true (unobservable) underlying return of an index at time n, 
          
*
nr  = the observed return of an index at time n and 
      
*
1−nrλ  = the observed smoothed return of an index at time n-1.  
 
Aside from rounding errors, the new unsmoothed return series will have the same mean as the 
smoothed. However, the standard deviation will increase if the first order autocorrelation 
coefficient is positive and decrease if it is negative. 
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4.0 Modern Portfolio Theory  
In this chapter we will present the mean-variance framework as well as the limitations of it 
when considering hedge funds. In addition, we will briefly present asset pricing models.  
  
4.1 The Mean-Variance Framework 
Modern Portfolio Theory was introduced by Harry M. Markowitz in 1952. He won the Nobel 
Prize for his work on mean-variance selection theory, and in 1959 he published a book about 
portfolio selection. His research is considered as one of the most important contributions to 
financial theory through history. The mean-variance framework is widely used in 
performance evaluation of investments. It has also enthused various extensions and 
applications. 
 
4.1.1 Markowitz’s Efficient Frontier 
Prior to Markowitz’s portfolio theory, investors’ emphasize was on selecting single assets 
which offered the highest return with the least risk. They constructed a portfolio out of these 
assets without considering the assets’ effect on the portfolio as a whole.  
 
Markowitz’s portfolio selection model proposes how rational investors diversify to minimize 
expected risk and maximize expected return. By diversifying, the overall risk is reduced by 
spreading the investment among different assets. The less correlated the assets, the less is the 
risk of the portfolio. In other words, investors should invest in portfolios rather than 
individual assets. 
 
The model assumes investors to be risk-averse. Mean (or expected return) and standard 
deviation are proxies for reward and risk. The opportunities available are summarized by the 
minimum-variance frontier of risky assets. It provides the lowest possible variance achievable 
for a certain expected return of a portfolio. Rational investors will always choose the portfolio 
with the lowest risk, given they have the same expected return. If an investor desires higher 
expected return, he also needs to carry more risk. The trade-off will depend on the individual 
investor’s degree of risk aversion.  
 
The optimal trade-off between risk and expected return is captured by the efficient frontier as 
shown in figure 2. The efficient frontier is located in the upper region of the minimum-
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variance frontier. The assets located below the efficient frontier are considered inefficient 
since other assets can generate a higher expected return at the same risk. Investors should 
therefore choose a portfolio located at the efficient frontier. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 The Capital Allocation Line (CAL) 
By introducing a risk-free asset into the universe of risky assets, investors are allowed to 
borrow and loan at a risk-free rate. The risk-free asset is uncorrelated with any other asset. 
The introduction of a risk-free asset presents risk-return profiles superior to those on the 
efficient frontier. The capital allocation line shows the portfolio opportunities available to 
investors when combining a risky with a risk-free asset. The CAL is a straight line and is 
defined as: 
σ
σ fCfC
rrE
rrE
−
+=
)()(         (4.1) 
where )( CrE  = the expected return of a combination of a given risky portfolio and the risk-  
                         free asset, 
      )(rE - fr  = the expected return of a given risky portfolio above the risk-free rate, 
      σ = the standard deviation of a given portfolio and 
σ  
 
Individual Assets 
E(r) The Efficient Frontier 
Global 
Minimum- 
Variance  
Portfolio Minimum-Variance Frontier 
Figure 2: The Efficient Frontier  
Source: Bodie et.al. (2005) 
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Figure 3: The Capital Market Line 
Source: Bodie et.al. (2005) 
     Cσ = the standard deviation of the combination of a given risky portfolio and the 
risk-free asset. 
 
 The slope of the CAL represents the reward-to-variability ratio and is given by: 
 
σ
frrES
−
=
)(
        (4.2) 
 
The slope is also known as the Sharpe ratio. The portfolio on the efficient frontier with the 
highest Sharpe ratio is known as the market portfolio. When the market portfolio is combined 
with a risk-free asset, it is called the capital market line (CML). It is tangent to the efficient 
frontier and dominates all other feasible lines, as shown in figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Criticism of the Mean-Variance Framework 
One simplifying assumptions of the mean-variance theory is that risk can be fully described 
by the variance of return of an asset. This assumption is only valid if returns are normally 
distributed and/or if investors hold a quadratic utility function.  
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Quadratic utility functions tell us that investors only care about the two first moments of the 
distribution to solve the maximization problem, regardless if the returns are normally 
distributed. This is not coherent with the behaviour of a rational investor. 
 
According to Bodie et al. (2005), the utility that an investor derives from a portfolio, with a 
given expected return and standard deviation, can be described by the following quadratic 
utility function: 
 
2)( σArEU −=           (4.3) 
where U = the utility value,  
       E(r) = the expected return (mean),  
     A ≥ 0 = the investor’s degree of risk aversion and 
        
2σ  = the variance. 
 
Thus, the investor only considers mean and variance. The utility function is a curve with a 
decreasing slope. Since a quadratic utility function only has positive marginal utility under the 
bounded range, it places unrealistic behaviour on investors. It has a maximum beyond in 
which the marginal utility of money declines, and according to Wippern (1971) this is an 
inconsistent and implausible property. 
 
The quadratic utility function also tells us that investors have increasing risk aversion, which 
implies reduced risk taking as wealth increases. Empirical evidence (see for instance Pratt 
(1964) and Arrow (1965)) and theoretical considerations, on the other hand, tell us that 
investors possess a decreasing (absolute) risk-aversion. In the real world, utility functions of 
investors can be highly complex and of an irregular shape. 
 
If the Markowitz portfolio theory cannot rely on the quadratic utility function of investors, it 
rests heavily on the assumption that return is normally distributed and fully described by its 
mean and variance. As stated earlier, hedge fund returns are usually not characterized by a 
normal distributed return. Investment opportunities characterized by higher moments is 
therefore eliminated for investors. The mean-variance framework does therefore not fully 
make sense when analyzing and evaluating hedge funds.  
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4.2 Asset Pricing Models 
Asset pricing models value assets relative to the market or other risk factors. There have been 
developed a number of asset pricing models. We can separate them into single and multi-
factor models. Single-factor models explain the price of an asset by only one factor. Multi-
factor models explain the price by several independent factors. In this paper we will present 
two widely known asset pricing models; the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the arbitrage 
pricing theory.  
 
4.2.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Markowitz’s mean-variance analysis became the foundation of the widely known and applied 
Capital Asset Pricing Model. The CAPM is a centrepiece of modern financial economics and 
was developed by William Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) and Jan Mossin (1966). The 
CAPM describes the relationship between an asset’s expected return and risk, and is used in 
pricing risky assets. It also emphasizes the underlying principle of diversifying.   
 
An important aspect of the CAPM is that volatility can be split into systematic and firm-
specific risk. The systematic risk is related to market movements and cannot be diversified 
away. Firm-specific risk is related to the specific asset and can be eliminated if a portfolio is 
well diversified. The purpose of diversification is therefore to get rid of unsystematic risk and 
thus only reward investors for carrying systematic risk. 
 
The main conclusion of the CAPM is that a risky asset’s expected return should be given by 
the risk-free rate of return and its risk-premium: 
 
])([)( fMf rrErrE −+= β         (4.4) 
where )(rE  = the expected return of a given asset,  
               fr  = the risk-free rate of return,  
               β  = the sensitivity of a given asset’s returns to market movements and     
 fM rrE −)(  = the market’s expected excess return above the risk-free asset. 
                 
The CAPM states that fairly priced assets should plot along a straight line called the security 
market line (SML). By rearranging the equation to excess return we obtain the asset’s risk 
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premium. The slope of the line equals the market’s risk premium and its intercepts is at the 
risk-free rate of return:  
 
])([)( fMf rrErrE −=− β         (4.5) 
 
4.2.1.1 The Single Index Model 
The CAPM is a theoretical model meant to be interpreted ex-ante. Performance evaluation is 
often done ex-post, based on historical data. The solution is to transform the CAPM into an 
ex-post testable relationship. Often this is done by a series regression by taking the excess 
return of individual assets against the excess return on a market index. This is called the single 
index model and is defined by: 
 
)(][
,,,
nrrrr nfnMnfn εβα +−+=−        (4.6) 
where nfn rr ,−  = the excess return above the risk-free rate of a given asset at time n, 
           α  = the intercept of the regression line, 
                      β  = the slope of the regression line for a given asset, 
          nfnM rr ,, −  = the market’s excess return above the risk-free rate at time n and 
       )(nε = the unexpected firm-specific return for a given asset at time n. 
 
nr  and nMr ,  are the observed returns of a given asset and the market index proxy at time n, 
respectively. Given market efficiency and that the CAPM holds, α should not be statistically 
different from zero, and )(nε  is expected to have a mean of zero. 
 
Hedge fund managers follow different strategies and styles. It can therefore be argued that 
single-factor models are not sufficient to explain hedge fund returns. More than one 
systematic risk factor needs to be explained. 
 
4.2.2 The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
The arbitrage pricing theory was developed Stephen Ross in 1976. It is less restrictive in its 
assumption than the CAPM. In the APT, the price of an asset is driven by many factors. It 
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specifies the returns as linear function of many factors. These are both micro and macro 
factors.  The model can be defined as: 
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Where K is the number of factors and F is the risk-premium associated with each factor.  
It is up to each investor to identify the factors affecting an asset, as well as the factors risk 
premium and the sensitivity of the asset to these factors. 
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5.0 Risk Adjusted Performance Measures 
Investors are considered to be risk averse and need to be compensated for the exposure of 
risk. Risk adjusted performance measures facilitate the comparison of return related to 
different levels of risk. A relative performance measure is when an asset is evaluated against a 
benchmark index. When no benchmark index is used it is called an absolute performance 
measure. A number of different risk adjusted performance measures has been developed, and 
it can be a challenge to identify the most appropriate measure.  
 
5.1 Traditional Performance Measures 
In the following sections we will present three traditional risk-adjusted performance 
measures. This is the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha.  
 
5.1.1 The Sharpe Ratio 
Nobel price winner William F. Sharpe’s (1934 - ) work on mutual fund performance is an 
essential contribution to portfolio performance evaluation. In addition to being one of the 
originators of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, he developed one of the most commonly used 
performance measures; the Sharpe ratio, as presented in equation 4.2.  
 
As in mean-variance theory, the Sharpe ratio is based upon the assumptions that returns are 
normally distributed and/or quadratic utility functions. The Sharpe ratio is an absolute 
performance measure where no benchmark index is needed. It measures the reward-to-
variability; the excess return per unit of risk. The higher Sharpe ratio, the better is the 
investment. 
 
5.1.2 The Treynor Ratio 
The Treynor ratio is a reward-to-risk ratio similar to the Sharpe ratio. The most important 
difference is that the Treynor ratio focuses only on systematic risk instead of total risk. It is 
also a relative performance measure, with a proxy of the market as a benchmark. The ratio is 
named after Jack L. Treynor and is defined as: 
 
Treynor β
frr
ratio
−
=         (5.1) 
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High values of the ratio indicate greater return per unit of market risk and are hence always 
desirable.  
 
5.1.3 Jensen’s Alpha  
Jensen’s alpha is a relative performance measure named after Harvard professor Michael 
Jensen. It is based on the CAPM, and is a measure of how much a manager’s forecasting 
ability contributes to the returns of the fund. The alpha is the difference between the realized 
return and the return predicted by the CAPM. It is defined as: 
 
Jensen’s alpha [ ])( fMf rrrr −+−= βα       (5.2) 
 
The CAPM states that only market risk should be rewarded and the alpha should be zero. If 
this is not the case, the alpha can be interpreted as an indicator of superior performance when 
it is positive or poor performance when it is negative. If choosing between several funds with 
identical systematic risk, the fund with the highest alpha should be selected. 
 
5.2 Criticism of Traditional Performance Measures 
A shortcoming of the traditional performance measures is that they are based upon the mean-
variance theory. Hedge funds typically are not normally distributed, and therefore all aspects 
of risk are not captured. If the distribution is skewed or have an excess kurtosis which 
deviates from zero, the traditional performance measures may lead to wrong conclusions. 
Gregoriou and Gueyie (2003) show that the Sharpe ratio often overestimates the hedge fund 
performance because of this. Scott and Horvath (1980) also show that under relative weak 
assumptions investors like positive skewness and dislike positive excess kurtosis. Another 
drawback with traditional performance measures is that they do not take into account that 
investors distinguish between upside and downside risk. Investors are often more unpleased 
with a loss than they are pleased with a gain of equal size. This gives reason for a heavier 
weighted downside deviation when measuring performance of an asset. 
 
The relative performance measures suffer from further difficulties. One is that beta is used as 
the only measure of systematic risk. According to Lhabitant (2006) are hedge funds exposed 
to many factors such as volatility risk, default risk and liquidity risk. The risk factors also vary 
among the strategies. This complicates the task of finding a suitable benchmark. Relative 
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performance measures further assume risk factors to be linear. Another faulty is that if the 
Treynor ratio is used on a beta-neutral hedge fund, it would have a ratio moving towards 
infinity (Sharma (2004)).  
 
In view of these remarks we therefore choose not to use Jensen’s alpha or the Treynor ratio 
when evaluating hedge fund performance. The only traditional measure we will use is the 
Sharpe ratio.  
 
5.3 Innovative Performance Measures 
Because of the limitations in traditional performance measures, innovative measures have 
been developed. Several researchers have tried to take into account the fact that standard 
deviation penalizes upside and downside deviation equally. There have also been developed 
measures which accounts for higher moments, as well as autocorrelation in return series. We 
will present some of these pioneering performance measures in this chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Modified Sharpe Ratio 
The non-normal returns of hedge funds might cause problems using the traditional Sharpe 
ratio to evaluate risk-adjusted performance. Gregoriou and Gueyie (2003) therefore developed 
the modified Sharpe ratio, which is an improvement of the traditional Sharpe ratio. The 
standard deviation in the traditional Sharpe ratio is replaced with the modified Value-at-Risk 
(MVaR) developed by Favre and Galeano (2002). In addition to expected return and standard 
deviation, it takes into consideration skewness and excess kurtosis. Modified Sharpe is 
defined as: 
 
Modified Sharpe ratio =
MVaR
rr f−
         (5.3) 
 
MVaR is based on the Cornish-Fisher expansion (1937) and is defined as: 
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where E(r) = a given asset’s asset expected return, mean. 
    zc = critical value for probability (1- α), -1.96 for 95% probability 
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     S = skewness 
    K = excess kurtosis 
    σ = a given asset’s standard deviation. 
  
Gregoriou and Gueyie (2003) ranked thirty funds of hedge funds according to the Sharpe and 
modified Sharpe ratio, and the results indicate that the modified Sharpe ratio is lower and 
more precise when non-normal returns are examined.  
 
5.3.2 Autocorrelation-Adjusted Sharpe Ratio 
Lo (2002) documents that positive autocorrelation in hedge fund returns can overstate the 
Sharpe ratio by as much as 65 percent. When serial correlation is taken into account, the 
rankings of hedge funds based on the Sharpe ratio can change substantially. He therefore 
suggests using an autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratio SR(q), which is the defined in the 
following way: 
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where SR = the regular monthly Sharpe ratio, 
 kp  = the k
th
 autocorrelation for hedge fund returns and 
 SRq)(η = the annualized autocorrelation adjusted Sharpe ratio with q = 12. 
 
When returns are independently and identically distributed, the annualized Sharpe ratio is 
calculated by multiplying the monthly Sharpe ratio with the square root of 12 (months). If the 
return distribution exhibits positive autocorrelation; η(q) is less than q . This may overstate 
the regular Sharpe ratio as compared to the true (autocorrelation-adjusted) Sharpe ratio. In a 
study of a database provided by Zurich Capital Market, Liang (2003) found that the 
autocorrelation of hedge the fund returns can have different impacts on the Sharpe ratio.  
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5.3.3 The Sortino Ratio 
The Sortino ratio was developed by Frank Sortino, the director of the pension research 
institute in San Francisco. The Sortino ratio is a modification of the Sharpe ratio by 
accounting for asymmetry of the distribution. Instead of focusing on the total risk, it only 
penalizes for downside risk. It is given by: 
 
The Sortino ratio = 
DD
MARr −
       (5.7) 
 
The downside deviation equals: 
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where nr  = the return of a given asset at time n 
      MAR = the minimum acceptable return (or target rate), and 
        DD  = the downside deviation of a given asset. 
 
MAR is usually set to zero, the risk-free rate or the average return. When the target rate is set 
to the average historical return, it is called semi-deviation or semi-variance.  
 
5.3.4 Omega 
Omega is a performance measurement introduced by Keating and Shadwick (2002). All 
features of the risk and return of an asset are incorporated into this measure. It partitions 
return into loss and gain above and below a threshold, and considers the probability weighted 
ratio above and below the partitioning.  
 
The Omega function is defined in continuous time as: 
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where (a,b) = the interval of returns, 
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            F(r) = the cumulative return distribution and  
               L = the threshold return.  
 
The threshold depends on individual preferences. The expected gain is the amount by which it 
exceeds the threshold, and the expected loss is the amount by which it falls below the 
threshold. The function is decreasing from (a, b) to (0, ∞ ) and has a mean value of 1.  
According to Keating and Shadwick (2002) this function can in a mathematical precise sense 
be viewed as a return distribution itself, since it is not just trying to approximate it as some 
other performance measurements. No assumptions about risk preferences or utility are needed 
to use Omega, although one can apply any. Only a simple decision rule that more is preferred 
than less is needed. Assets are ranked depending on their intervals of return and the Omega 
accounts for the effect of all moments. The slope of the Omega function tells us about the 
probability of extreme values; the steeper it is, the less is the probability of extreme values. 
 
De Souza and Gockan (2004) present the Omega formula in a discrete case: 
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where +nr  ( −nr ) equals the return above (below) the threshold L at time n.  
 
The highest Omega is preferred. The Omega measure tends to supply a different ranking of 
funds than the traditional performance measures, such as the Sharpe ratio, when there is a 
significant presence of higher moments. When there is little significance of higher moments, 
the ranking are to be rather similar. 
 
5.3.5 Kappa 
Kaplan and Knowles presented Kappa, a generalized downside risk-adjusted performance 
measure, in 2004. The term “generalized” means that Kappa can become any risk-adjusted 
return measure through a single parameter. Kappa is defined as: 
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where r  = the average periodic return, 
  τ = the investor’s minimum acceptable or threshold return, and  
 LPMn(τ) = the nth lower partial moment with respect to the threshold τ.  
 
The nth lower partial moment can be defined in two ways; using a parameter based calculation 
or discrete data. A parameter-based calculation involves deriving a continuous return 
distribution from the values of the first four moments and is defined as: 
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A discrete calculation is defined as: 
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where N = the sample size and 
 rn =  the return observation at time n. 
 
Kn is defined for any value of n exceeding zero. It is obvious that Omega is equal to K1+1 and 
the Sortino ratio to K2. 
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6.0 Hedge Funds 
In this chapter we will present some common characteristics of hedge funds. We will also 
describe the different hedge fund strategies which will be analyzed in this thesis.  
 
6.1 Hedge Fund Characteristics 
There is no precise legal definition of hedge funds. There are several contradictory definitions 
based on legal structures, superior returns, risk taking or hedging, and more. Nevertheless, 
hedge funds share some common characteristics that make it possible to distinguish them 
from traditional investment funds.  
 
 Absolute Returns 
An often used description of hedge funds is that their managers target absolute returns. 
According to Hedges (2004), most of the returns of hedge funds are derived from manager 
skills rather than the returns of an asset class. The managers’ objective is to be profitable 
regardless of the situation in the stock and bond market.  
 
 Active Management 
The performance of hedge funds normally results from active management decisions together 
with the skills of the fund’s managers. The managers reject traditional theories such as the 
efficient market hypothesis and modern portfolio theory. They believe that not all assets are 
priced correctly, and therefore pursue strategies to take advantage of this. 
 
 Performance Fees 
Hedge funds have more complex fee structures as compared to traditional funds. Management 
fees are basically imposed to meet operating expenses. They are usually a percentage of assets 
under management, and the size of them range from 1 to 3% per year. Incentive fees have the 
purpose of encouraging managers to achieve the highest returns possible, and usually range 
from 15 to 25% of the annual realized performance. Many hedge funds include a hurdle rate 
and/or a high-water mark clause in order to avoid agency problems and excessive risk taking. 
The hurdle rate gives a minimum performance the manager must accomplish before he can 
charge a performance fee. The high-water mark states that previous losses have to be regained 
by new profits before the incentive fee can be charged.  
 
 35
According to Lhabitant (2006), many hedge funds also include a proportional adjustment 
clause. If some investors withdraw their assets, the manager can reduce proportionally the 
high-water mark by the percentage of the removed assets. Some funds also have a clawback 
clause and a loss recovery account. The clawback clause specifies that a part of the incentive 
fee will be retained every year, generally until the account reaches a given percentage of the 
assets. If performance is negative, the clawback account will be debited to the clients’ credit 
at the rate of the incentive fee. The clients can recover a share of their losses with portions of 
previous paid incentive fees. If the negative performance exceeds the clawback account, 
future incentive fees will be credited to a loss recovery account. The manager will not earn 
any incentive fee until it is reduced to zero.  
 
 Investment Strategies 
Hedge funds have flexible investment policies. This permit the managers to adapt to market 
conditions and thereby pursue profits or control risk The managers can combine long and 
short positions, concentrate rather than diversify, borrow and leverage their portfolios, invest 
in illiquid assets, trade derivatives and hold unlisted securities. If the market is unfavourable, 
the managers can move into cash, hedge against declines, or attempt to earn profits by short 
sale. They can also switch strategies or markets if they observe better opportunities.  
 
 Liquidity 
Traditional funds offer daily subscription and redemption. This is appreciated by investors, 
but does not come without a cost. The funds have to keep a small pool of cash as a liquidity 
buffer. This tends to lower the overall performance, since return of cash normally is lower 
than on other investments. Some investment opportunities are in addition illiquid and hard to 
sell, and hence not compatible with high liquidity. Most hedge funds therefore limit the 
subscription and redemption possibilities, and demand a minimum investment period. This is 
particularly funds investing in illiquid markets and securities. Subscription to close-end funds 
is only possible during their initial issuing period, while open-end funds offer subscription on 
a regular basis. The restrictions have a positive impact on a hedge fund’s performance, as 
managers can focus on investing rather than on redeeming assets of investors. They can focus 
on longer time horizons, hold illiquid positions and reduce cash holdings. 
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6.2 Hedge Fund Strategies 
There are thousand of different hedge funds, and it is difficult to classify them into a limited 
number of categories. Hedge funds are not a homogeneous group; some funds fit into more 
than one category, and some funds fit in none. This is partly due to the risk and return 
characteristics which differ among the hedge funds. There are several different data providers 
which track thousands of hedge funds. They classify differently regarding number and type of 
strategies, but they have the most fundamental categories in common. In the following 
sections we will present the strategies analyzed in this thesis.  
 
6.2.1 Long/Short Equity  
This strategy is also called equity hedge. The funds combine long positions of equities with 
short sales with the purpose of reducing market risk. The portfolios can be anywhere between 
net long and net short depending on market conditions. Normally the managers increase long 
exposure in bull markets, and decrease it or are net short in bear markets. The short position is 
used to hedge against a decline in the stock market and to generate an ongoing positive return. 
The funds earn profits when long positions appreciate and stocks sold short depreciate, and 
loose otherwise. In bull markets, the source of return is similar to that of traditional stock 
pickers. The difference is in bear markets, when the funds use short sale and hedging in order 
to outperform the market.  
 
6.2.2 Dedicated Short Bias 
The managers of dedicated short bias funds take more short positions than long positions. The 
funds earn returns by maintaining net short exposure in long and short equities. Short sale 
involves searching for overvalued companies, borrow their shares, and sell them short. The 
managers expect the price to decline so they can buy the shares back at a lower price and 
return them to the lender. The difference in price is the profit. If the stock price increases, the 
repurchase price will be higher than the original selling price, and they will make a loss.  
 
An advantage of dedicated short selling is that the opportunities is unexploited, as most 
traditional asset managers primarily seek long term buy and hold opportunities. However, 
there are also dangers involved. Stocks tend to appreciate over time and reward investors with 
a positive risk premium. Short sellers suffer from this natural long-term uptrend. If prices go 
up, many short sellers have to buy back shares to close their position. The consequence can be 
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that prices will continue to rise, which leads to more buy-backs and so on. The shorted stock 
becomes even more overpriced than in the beginning. Dedicated short sale can hence be 
extremely risky when applied on a stand-alone basis, because the downside potential is 
theoretically unlimited. As long as the shorted stock price is rising, the short seller is loosing.  
 
6.2.3 Equity Market Neutral 
The objective of equity market neutral hedge funds is to construct portfolios without net 
market exposure. Long and short positions are balanced to remain market neutral at all times. 
Hence, returns are not affected by market conditions, but only by stock selection. Equity 
market neutral hedge funds may use a range of strategies. One is arbitrage trading, which can 
involve trading between futures and common stocks, buying and selling related classes of 
common stock, or option strategies. According to McCrary (2005), equity market neutral 
funds are much less linked to financial market uncertainty than funds of common stocks, but 
despite the name the category is linked to market stock returns. 
 
6.2.4 Event Driven 
This strategy is also called corporate life cycle investing, and the funds invest in opportunities 
created by significant transactional events. This is extraordinary corporate transactions such 
as liquidations, mergers and acquisitions, share buybacks, bankruptcies and reorganisations. 
The fund managers try to foresee the outcome of a certain transaction and locate the most 
favourable time to commit capital to this transaction. Some hedge managers use one core 
strategy while others invest opportunistically across the different types of events. The 
managers use instruments such as long and short common and preferred stocks, debt 
securities, warrants, stubs, and options. The performance normally depends on how well the 
manager forecasts the outcome and times the transactional event.  
 
6.2.5 Distressed Securities 
Distressed securities hedge funds focus on investment opportunities in securities of companies 
in financial distress, default or bankruptcy. The funds are often controversial and viewed as 
vultures, but they also serve an important role in the restructuring process in distressed firms. 
Distressed securities trade at large discounts to their intrinsic value, and the fund managers try 
to profit on the issuer’s capability to improve its operation or the success of the bankruptcy 
process. The strategy is usually long biased, but managers may also take complete long, 
hedged or complete short positions.  
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6.2.6 Merger Arbitrage  
Merger arbitrage or risk arbitrage normally involves investing in securities of a company 
which is target of a takeover, merger or other extraordinary corporate transactions after an 
attempt is announced. The funds purchase stocks of companies being acquired or merged, and 
sell short stocks of acquiring companies. The typical position includes a long position that can 
be delivered to close out the short position if the deal is completed, but more complicated 
positions may also be employed. The profit or loss is the difference between the price of the 
securities purchased and the realized value when the deal is completed. The success of the 
strategy normally depends on the proposed merger, tender offer, exchange offer or acquisition 
being consummated. When a proposal is publicly announced, the value of the securities of the 
acquiring company is normally greater than of the securities of the target company. Usually 
the stock of the acquiring company depreciates while the stock of the target company 
appreciates.  
 
6.2.7 Convertible Arbitrage 
Convertible securities such as convertible bonds and convertible preferred stocks or warrants 
are fixed income instruments that may be converted into equity. Convertible securities are 
often issued below their fair value, and this creates arbitrage opportunities. In an attempt to 
benefit from price inefficiencies, convertible arbitrage hedge fund managers buy long 
positions in convertible securities and hedge a part of the equity risk by selling short the stock. 
There are several reasons why convertible securities are valued differently from their fair 
value. According to Lhabitant (2006), pricing of convertible securities is difficult due to the 
simultaneous presence of interest risk, credit risk, and equity risk, as well as the interaction 
between these. In addition to this, convertible bonds often have a range of specific features. 
Issuers of convertible securities are typically young and fast growing with a low debt rating. 
The market value of the debt is generally closely tied to the market value of the common 
stock. This is because the company can reliably repay the bonds when it does well. 
 
6.2.8 Emerging Markets 
Emerging market hedge funds invest in securities issued by countries or companies of 
emerging markets. Emerging markets are, according to CS/Tremont, countries which are 
considered to be in a transitional phase between developing and developed status. This is 
markets like China, India, Latin America, much of Southeast Asia and parts of Eastern Europe 
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and Africa. The investments can be in currency, debt, equity or other instruments. The 
portfolios may be either widely diversified from many countries or focus on a particular 
country or region. Since there often are no futures or derivatives markets for hedging, the 
securities are fairly risky. They are usually not hedged, and the funds tend to use little or no 
leverage. According to McCrary (2005), emerging markets hedge funds have been among the 
highest-performing, but the funds also have one of the highest volatilities of returns.  
.  
6.2.9 Fixed Income Arbitrage 
Fixed income arbitrage hedge funds rely mainly on debt instruments. The funds combine long 
and short positions with derivative instruments. By doing so they hedge the level of interest 
rates, credit risks, the rates of one maturity sector versus other maturity sectors, and other 
factors. The hedges are very effective because interest rates tend to move up and down 
together. Since they remove much of the day-to-day portfolio risks, arbitrage funds generally 
have higher leverage than other hedge fund strategies. The funds can take large positions in a 
foreign currency; thereby hedging away the currency exposure. They can also buy individual 
issues with considerable interest rate risk and then hedge this away.  
 
6.2.10 Global Macro 
Global macro hedge funds have some of the highest return among hedge fund strategies, and 
have long been the most successful and largest category. The funds can be very different from 
each other and do not behave in a homogenous way, but according to Lhabitant (2006) most 
of them have two typical characteristics. The first is the global nature of their strategies. They 
take leveraged bets across a range of liquid markets in order to profit from anticipated trends, 
market biases, or expectations about future cyclical or structural changes in specific countries 
or regions. The second is that their main focus lies on structural macroeconomic imbalances 
and to discover macroeconomic trends. Most funds only invest once markets have swung 
furthest away from equilibrium and get out when the imbalance have been corrected.   
 
6.2.11 Managed Futures/Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) 
According to Lhabitant (2006), “the terms managed futures, Commodity Trading Advisors 
(CTAs) or trading funds are now used interchangeably to describe the group of professional 
money managers that use futures contracts as an investment medium or give advice on trading 
futures contracts or commodity options”. Managed futures or CTAs primarily invest in listed 
bond, equity, commodity futures and currency markets. The funds use a significant amount of 
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leverage as the strategy involves the use of futures contracts. In the 1980s, agricultural and 
metal futures trading accounted for most of the market activity, and currency and interest rates 
futures for a small share. Today global markets are dominated by financial futures for 
currencies, interest rates and stock indices. The term CTA is therefore now a misleading 
name, as their portfolios have followed the same evolution as the global futures markets and 
are mainly invested in non-commodity related futures contracts. 
 
6.2.12 Multi-Strategy 
Multi-strategy hedge funds allocate capital based on perceived opportunities among a number 
of hedge fund strategies. Through diversification of capital, the fund managers seek to deliver 
constantly positive returns in spite of directional movement in equity, interest rate or currency 
markets. This increased diversification evens the returns and decrease asset-class and single-
strategy risks. The strategies used by a multi-strategy hedge fund may be convertible bond 
arbitrage, equity long/short, statistical arbitrage and merger arbitrage. In addition to achieve 
improved diversification of the portfolio, managers may use a multi-strategy in order to better 
use their range of portfolio management skills and philosophies. 
 
6.2.13 Funds of Hedge Funds 
Funds of hedge funds invest in other hedge funds. An advantage with this type of fund is that 
diversification reduces risk. This is particularly an advantage for those who invest limited 
resources in hedge fund assets. The funds can either invest in funds from a range of strategies, 
managers, markets and risk factors, or invest in funds following the same strategy. The first 
method gives the highest risk reduction, as the funds are likely to hold fewer stocks in 
common. The latter avoids the risk of poor manager performance, while still remaining 
exposed to an investment style. The major danger with diversification is to overdiversify since 
each fund already is diversified. Monitoring many funds is also costly and takes time.  
 
Another advantage with funds of funds is the affordability and ease of access. The minimum 
investment required is often smaller than for regular hedge funds. This makes it possible for 
smaller investors to afford hedge fund diversification. The conditions for entering and 
redemption are more flexible than those of the underlying funds. This requires, as explained 
earlier, a certain level of liquidity, which comes with a cost. 
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Funds of funds charge several types of fees, with the most common being management fee 
and performance fees. This extra cost for the investors is the major disadvantage with these 
funds, because investors have to pay fees in addition to those paid to the funds which are 
invested in. If the average return of a well and a poorly performing fund is zero, investors still 
have to pay fee for the well performing fund even though the average return is zero.  
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7.0 Biases in Hedge Fund Databases  
Several factors can affect the quality of the databases. Liang (2003) lists factors that have a 
positive effect on the quality. The first is that hedge funds which are audited effectively have 
lower absolute return inconsistency than funds which are not audited. The second factor is 
that the respect of a transparency principle is a dependable indicator of the quality of the data. 
Funds of hedge funds seem to report returns more precisely than single hedge funds. Last, 
there is a significant positive correlation between hedge fund size and auditing; large funds 
are more often audited than small ones.  
 
Several biases can have important impact on performance measures of hedge fund databases. 
Lhabitant (2006) claims that there are two main sources of biases in hedge fund databases. 
The first is how each database is built. Some of these biases are called neutral since they are 
inbuilt in the data gathering. By using complicated calculations they can be removed, but 
some will always exist since it is impossible to observe absolutely every hedge fund. The 
second source is stale hedge fund prices which are being reported directly by the managers. 
These biases can, in worst case, cause errors that make the data useless. Biases often 
described in hedge fund literature are survivorship bias, self-selection bias, instant history 
bias, database/sample selection bias, and infrequent pricing and illiquidity bias. 
 
7.1 Survivorship Bias 
Survivorship bias occurs when funds are excluded from databases and performance measures 
because they no longer exist; when databases only include information from “surviving 
funds”. When a fund is liquidated it is normally due to bad performance or a sequence of 
large and sudden losses, but there are also other reasons why funds are excluded from 
databases. The fund can be merged with another fund or stop reporting but remain active. 
Funds that stop being in a database but still exist are called defunct funds, while funds that 
exit from a database and stop operating are called dead funds. Well-performing funds that 
close create a downward bias on measures, while poor-performing funds make an upward bias 
when excluded from databases. Brooks and Kat (2002) state that around 30 % of newly 
established hedge funds do not survive the first three years, mainly due to lack of 
performance. Barry (2002) writes that the occurrence of death among hedge funds is much 
higher than for traditional mutual funds. Most databases started the data collecting in the 
middle or end of the 1990s. The hedge funds available today are mainly not the same that 
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have been available for the last decade and contributed to the successful results. Hence, if 
disappearance of funds was due to performance reasons and data on those funds were 
removed from the database, historical returns may be overstated and historical risk 
understated.  
 
To calculate survivorship bias, we need to calculate the difference between the performance 
of all funds that existed over a certain period of time and the performance of the funds that are 
still operating at the end of the period. The difficulty with this method is that the complete 
sample of hedge funds is not available, so survivorship bias has to be estimated from samples 
of surviving and dead funds. Most data vendors now include funds that no longer exist in their 
index calculations and avoid the problem with survivorship bias, but there are some 
exceptions.  
 
7.2 Self-Selection Bias 
Hedge funds are private investment pools and therefore not required to reveal information 
concerning performance or assets to anyone but their investors. Moreover, it is up to the 
managers what information is to be provided. As a consequence, the observed hedge funds 
will not represent a true random sample of the complete population. This creates a bias. since 
the characteristics and performance of reporting funds may be different from those of the 
funds which are not reporting.  
 
Funds with good performance which want to attract new investors will have incentives for 
reporting to databases, while funds with poor performance will not want to report because 
they will appear bad compared to better performing funds. If reporting funds have better 
performance than non-reporting funds the databases will have a bias towards the best 
performing funds. However, there may be other reasons than poor performance to why a fund 
chooses not to report to a database. Many well-established and well-performing funds do not 
need or want to report to databases. Reasons for this may be that they have the investors they 
need, are managing the assets they want, or have reached their target price and thereby see no 
reason to report. Another reason may be that they are afraid to raise the performance of the 
database and hence make their individual performance look less differentiated. To summarize, 
whether the self-reporting bias is positive or negative depends on the circumstances. Since it 
is difficult to observe the not reporting funds, the impact of the bias cannot be quantified. 
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7.3 Backfill or Instant History Bias 
Géhin (2006) defines instant history bias as “the consequence of adding a hedge fund whose 
earlier good returns are backfilled between the inception date of the fund and the date on 
which it enters the database, while bad track records are not backfilled”.  
 
Backfill or instant history bias arises when hedge funds are allowed to backfill their historical 
returns when they join a database. They are entering it with “instant history”. The managers 
are given the opportunity to decide when the fund’s track record should be included in the 
database. According to Barry (2002), the lag that exists in several databases between funds’ 
starting date and the date they enter the database often corresponds to an incubation period of 
typically 12-18 months which are sponsored by a seed investor. Every manager wants to 
present best performance possible, and will therefore not report performance information in 
the incubation period. The manager will request to be included in the database with all of the 
fund’s track record if the performance turns out to be better than for the funds in the database. 
This will bias the historical performance upwards. 
 
Barry (2002) compared the date each fund was added to the TASS database with the date they 
started reporting returns. He found that around 80% of all funds backfill at least 6 months of 
data, around 65% backfill at least 12 months and around half of all funds backfill more than 
two years. Not all databases allow data to be backfilled, so the exposure of backfill bias varies 
among data providers. The data will still be distorted since some databases allow it.  
 
7.4 Database/Sample Selection Bias 
Database/sample selection bias occurs when a database or sample of funds to analyze is 
selected. This is because every database is incomplete since most of them only cover funds 
that meet specific criteria. These are for instance a minimum asset base, an audited track 
record or some years of existence. These criteria generate a sample selection bias towards 
particular segments of funds. For instance, some hedge fund strategies like managed futures 
and funds of hedge funds are excluded from some databases, but not from others.  
 
The criteria of a minimum time of existence creates an upward bias in databases compared to 
the entire universe of hedge funds since the worst performing funds will never survive long 
enough to enter the database. These biases are explicit, but there are also implicit selection 
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biases. One occurs because managers seldom report to all databases, which gives different 
sample sets and hence different results in the calculations made by the data providers. There 
are also differences in data selection methods among databases. Some databases let managers 
input and revise their prices, while others collect data directly from the administrators. The 
latter method is more reliable, but also more complicated to obtain.  
 
7.5 Infrequent Pricing and Illiquidity Bias  
Infrequent pricing and illiquidity bias primarily occurs for hedge funds holding illiquid 
securities or securities that are complicated to price. These are securities like for instance 
emerging market bonds, over-the-counter securities and distressed assets. There are small 
trading volumes and/or unavailability of effectively trading prices daily. The market price is 
not always available, and determination of fair net asset values becomes subjective and 
unclear. The last price of the security is often used. This is why this bias also is called stale 
price bias. In some cases, a price the manager finds reasonable is assigned.  
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8.0 Data Description  
In this chapter we will give a description of the data used in the thesis. We have analyzed 
hedge fund performance from the databases of CS/Tremont and Hedgenordic. From the 
CS/Tremont database we analyzed indices, while we analyzed individual Norwegian hedge 
funds from the Hedgenordic database.  
 
Our empirical part consists of two different time periods. In the first period from January 
1998 to February 2008 we only analyze CS/Tremont. The Hedgenordic database has limited 
information of Norwegian hedge funds previously to 2004. Hence, the second period is from 
January 2004 to February 2008. For this period we compare individual Norwegian hedge 
funds with the CS/Tremont indices. We also compare the two periods of CS/Tremont.  
 
As the figures for the funds in the Hedgenordic database were denoted in the local currencies, 
we have converted the returns into US dollar. This is to make the analysis comparable with 
the CS/Tremont indices. The various traditional assets are therefore also denoted in US 
dollars. Hence, our analysis is from a US point of view.  
 
As a proxy for the risk-free rate, we have used the 3-month US Treasury bill. The data is 
obtained from the US Federal Reserve. 
 
8.1 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index 
The Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index has existed since January 1994 and includes 
hedge funds from all over the world. The index is constructed using the CS/Tremont database, 
which tracks more than 4500 funds. The index universe is defined as funds with a minimum 
of US $50 million asset under management (AUM), a minimum one-year track record, and 
current audited financial statements. We have downloaded the data from the website of 
CS/Tremont.   
 
8.1.1 Subcategories 
CS/Tremont divides the funds into ten primary subcategories based on their investment style. 
One of them, event driven, is divided into three subcategories. Funds of hedge funds are not 
included. The categories are: 
 Convertible arbitrage 
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 Dedicated short bias 
 Emerging markets 
 Equity market neutral 
 Event driven: distressed, multi-strategy and risk arbitrage 
 Fixed income arbitrage 
 Global macro 
 Long/short equity 
 Managed futures 
 Multi-strategy  
 
8.1.2 Database Construction  
According to their web site, the index is the first and largest asset-weighted hedge fund index. 
As opposed to equal-weighting, this gives a more accurate picture of an investment in the 
asset class. It is done by analyzing the percentage of assets invested in each subcategory and 
selecting funds based on those percentages. This matches the shape of the index to the shape 
of the universe. The index always represents at least 85% of the AUM in each category of the 
index universe. The current sector weights1 are presented in figure 4:  
 
 
Figure 4: Sector weights of CS/Tremont, April 2008. 
 
The performance data is net of all fees and converted into US dollars. The index is calculated 
and rebalanced on a monthly basis, while funds are reselected on a quarterly basis.  
 
In order to limit biases in the database, funds that are closed to new investment are included in 
the index. The historic index data are not adjusted as new funds are added, so new funds will 
contribute to the index on a going-forward basis only. Corrections to the index will only be 
made on a going-forward basis. To minimize the effect of survivorship bias, funds in the 
                                                 
1
 April 2008 
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process of liquidation are not removed. This captures all potential negative performance 
before a fund stops to operate.  
 
8.2 Nordic Hedge Fund Index 
The Nordic Hedge Fund Index is published by Hedgenordic A/S. The index is based on 
performance reported by hedge fund managers in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. 
According to their own assessment, the majority of the Nordic hedge funds are included in the 
index. It currently consists of 18 Norwegian hedge funds2 and we have analyzed 9 of them. 
We have obtained the data by gaining access to the historical data at the website of 
Hedgenordic. 
 
8.2.1 Subcategories 
The individual hedge funds we have analyzed follow four different strategies: 
 Long/short equity: 
∼ Nordic Alpha Plc 
∼ Sector Maritime Investment 
∼ Discovery Fund Plc 
 Managed futures: 
∼ Interkraft Energy Fund 
 Multi-strategy: 
∼ WarrenWicklund Diversified Value 
∼ WarrenWicklund Nordic Hedge I 
 Funds of funds: 
∼ FMG Global Hedge Fund Ltd 
∼ FMG Bio-Med Hedge Fund Ltd 
∼ WarrenWicklund Multi-Strategy Fund 
In appendix 1 we give a brief description of each fund. 
 
8.2.2 Database Construction 
The Nordic Hedge Fund index is asset-weighted. Admission to the index is done 
continuously. Hedgenordic requires full performance history net of all fees, reported as either 
                                                 
2
 April 2008 
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monthly return or NAV, in order for funds to be admitted into the index. The fund must also 
provide the latest annual report and the latest version of the offering Memorandum. New 
funds will not be included prior to the registration date even if there is a qualified track 
record.   
 
Hedgenordic declare on their web site that in order to minimize the effect of survivorship bias 
and more accurately depict the performance of the Nordic hedge fund industry, funds that 
have been in existence and terminated operations are also entitled for inclusion in the index 
calculation. Figures for the time period in which a closing fund has been active are also 
included. Funds that end operations and no longer contribute data to the index will still have 
their prior performance history maintained. 
 
8.3 Indices for Comparison 
We have used different stock, bond and commodity indices for comparison. We will briefly 
present them in the following sections. 
 
8.3.1 Stock Indices 
The stock indices we have used are:  
 Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indices: 
∼ MSCI World Index. It measures the equity market performance of developed markets. 
It consists of 23 developed market country indices.  
∼ MSCI Emerging Markets Index. It measures equity performance of emerging markets. 
It consists of 25 emerging markets indices. 
∼ The MSCI Norway Index. We have used this index in the period of January 2004 to 
February 2008 when we analyzed the Norwegian hedge funds.   
The MSCI indices were gathered at the website of MSCI Barra.  
 NASDAQ Composite Index which includes more than 3000 companies. The NASDAQ is 
an electronic stock exchange. The index measures domestic and international based 
stocks. The data was obtained from the website of Yahoo! Finance.  
 S&P 500 by Standard & Poor’s. The index includes the stocks of 500 leading companies 
in industries of the US economy. The data was acquired from Standard & Poor’s’ website. 
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8.3.2 Bond Indices 
Bonds are fixed income instruments. Bond indices include government bond, high-yield 
bonds and corporate bonds among others. For bond indices we chose to use: 
 Lehman Global Aggregate Index. It is a measure of the global investment-grade fixed-rate 
debt markets.  
 Lehman US Corporate High-Yield Index. It covers the USD-denominated, non-investment 
grade, fixed rate, taxable corporate bond market. The index excludes emerging markets 
debt. 
We received the data from the index service of Lehman Brothers.  
 
8.3.3 Commodity Index 
For commodities we have used the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI). The 
index is calculated primarily on a world production-weighted basis and contains the main 
physical commodities in active, liquid futures markets. The data was achieved from the 
Standard & Poor’s index service.   
 
8.4 Description of the Period Analyzed 
Three crises have negatively affected the global stock market during the period of January 
1998 to February 2008. The first was the Russian crisis in 1998. This crisis was a 
consequence of the Asian crisis the year before, falling oil prices and the Russian 
government’s covering of budget deficit by short term loans with high interest rate. The 
second crisis was when the dot com bubble burst in 2000. NASDAQ was highly affected by 
the rise and fall of the information technology companies, but also the rest of the world’s 
stock markets experienced a decline. The third crisis was the decline because of the 
September 11th terrorist attack. The stock market has recently been facing a new recession, 
partly because of the decline in the US economy.     
 
To illustrate how the market has developed, figure 5 shows the growth of $100 for different 
indices since 1998. Overall, the CS/Tremont is superior to the other indices from the 
beginning of 2001. This index has also been the most stable, and shows less sensitivity to the 
crisis than the other indices. NASDAQ deviates from the others, with the peak in March 2000 
and the subsequent fall. This is the only index where the $100 is worth less in February 2008. 
In general, the stock indices reveal high correlation between each other as well as higher 
variations than the bond indices.  
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Figure 5: Growth of $100 for the CS/Tremont index, different stock indices and the T-bill. N=122.  
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9.0 Empirical Results of CS/Tremont (Jan.98- Feb.08) 
In this chapter we will start by giving an overview of the development of CS/Tremont Hedge 
Fund indices during the period from January 1998 to February 2008. We will then present and 
discuss results from the analysis of CS/Tremont. The findings will be compared with analysis 
of some general stock, commodity and bond indices.  
 
9.1 An Overview of the Development  
Figure 6 shows the development of $100 since January 1998 for the different CS/Tremont 
strategy indices. Global Macro is the index with the highest return in February 2008, while 
Dedicated Short Bias has the lowest. The latter is the only index which ends below the 
starting value. $100 is worth $81 in February 2008, while Global Macro ended on $429. 
Dedicated Short Bias hedge funds usually perform poorly in long lasting bull periods 
(Lhabitant (2006)), and we can see from the graph that this index declined in bull periods. The 
other hedge fund indices show an overall upward trend. However, most of them seem to have 
been affected by the Russian crisis in 1998. This was at the same time as the successful hedge 
fund Long Term Capital Management experienced great losses. The fund was bailed out by its 
major creditors in order to avoid a broader collapse in the financial markets.  
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Figure 6: Growth of $100 since 1997 for different CS/Tremont indices. Funds marked with * are subcategories 
of Event Driven. N=122.  
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9.2 Summary Statistics  
In table 1 we present the summary statistics of CS/Tremont and various stock, commodity and 
bond indices. We will discuss our major findings in the next sections. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Monthly Returns January 1998 – February 2008 
Excess Jarque- 
  Mean SD Min Max Skewn. Kurt. Bera 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Indices           
Convertible Arbitrage 0,66 1,41 -4,68 3,57 -1,25 3,03 78,29* 
Dedicated Short Bias -0,05 5,10 -8,69 22,71 0,97 2,39 48,06* 
Emerging Markets 0,79 4,09 -23,03 15,34 -1,55 9,81 538,47* 
Equity Market Neutral 0,80 0,64 -0,85 2,48 0,32 -0,18 2,26 
Event Driven 0,83 1,72 -11,77 3,27 -3,54 23,13 2974,16* 
        - Distressed 0,90 1,80 -12,45 3,91 -3,64 24,41 3299,44* 
        - Multi-Strategy 0,80 1,89 -11,52 4,66 -2,50 14,7 1225,99* 
        - Risk-Arbitrage 0,57 1,29 -6,15 3,81 -1,00 5,68 184,64* 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0,41 1,11 -6,96 2,05 -3,12 16,77 1627,57* 
Global Macro 0,97 2,44 -11,55 10,16 -0,75 7,43 291,80* 
Long/Short Equity 0,96 3,00 -11,43 13,01 0,21 4,59 107,83* 
Managed Futures 0,72 3,51 -8,62 9,95 0,11 -0,25 0,55 
Multi-Strategy 0,73 1,11 -4,76 3,02 -1,17 4,24 119,16* 
CS/Tremont Index 0,75 1,93 -7,55 8,53 -0,03 5,11 132,94* 
Panel B: Stock Indices           
MSCI Emerging Markets 1,11 6,94 -29,29 13,55 -0,92 2,06 39,04* 
MSCI World 0,45 4,09 -13,45 8,91 -0,61 0,74 10,47* 
NASDAQ 0,64 8,16 -22,9 21,98 -0,27 0,62 3,47 
S&P 500 0,26 4,31 -15,76 9,23 -0,66 1,11 15,12* 
Panel C: Commodity Index           
S&P GSCI  1,02 6,39 -14,41 16,89 0,07 -0,37 0,80 
Panel D: Bond Indices             
Lehman Global 0,53 1,57 -3,66 4,81 0,13 0,17 0,52 
Lehman US High-Yield 0,44 2,15 -7,37 7,49 -0,53 2,90 48,61* 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of monthly returns in the period from January 1998 to February 2008. Significant 
numbers are bold at 1%* and 5% level. N=122. 
 
 
9.2.1 The First Two Moments of the Return Distribution  
Hedge funds are known for having mean-variance combination superior to traditional assets. 
The scatter plot in figure 7 shows the monthly mean-variance characteristics of the various 
hedge fund indices and traditional assets. The hedge funds do indeed appear attractive since 
they overall provide a higher return and lower standard deviation. Only MSCI Emerging 
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Markets and S&P GSCI have a higher mean return, but this is along with a higher standard 
deviation. Dedicated Short Bias is an exception of the hedge fund indices. It shows a slightly 
negative return, and the highest monthly standard deviation (5,10%) of the hedge fund 
indices. As explained earlier, the style of this investment strategy is to identify overvalued 
companies and sell their shares short. If the strategy fails, it may lead to extreme losses.  
 
When only taking into account mean and volatility, the often advertised mean-variance 
qualities of hedge funds are supported. 
 
 
Figure 7: Mean-variance characteristics of the various hedge fund indices. Funds marked with * are 
subcategories of Event Driven. N=122. 
 
9.2.2 The Third and Fourth Moment of the Return Distribution  
Jarque-Bera test is used to see if the returns of the hedge fund strategies are normally 
distributed. It tests if the distributions have skewness and excess kurtosis close to zero. If the 
strategies reject the hypothesis of a normal distribution, there should be shown carefulness 
with rushing conclusions based upon mean-variance characteristics.  
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All except one of the hedge fund strategies reject the hypothesis of normal distributed returns. 
The Distressed strategy is the index with the highest value of the Jarque-Bera test. The only 
strategy which does not reject the test is Managed Futures.  
 
NASDAQ is the only stock index not rejecting the null hypothesis. However, the test values 
for the stock indices are considerably lower than for the hedge fund indices. The commodity 
index, GSCI, also shows an approximately normal distribution. Of the bond indices, Lehman 
US High-Yield is the only one rejecting the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 8 presents the Distressed and Managed Futures’ frequency histogram of return. The 
frequency histogram of Distressed, contrary to Managed Futures, reveals some extreme 
negative returns as well as more returns centred about the mean. The return distribution of 
Distressed clearly shows presence of negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis. 
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Figure 8: Frequency histograms of returns for Distressed and Managed Futures. N= 122 
 
In figure 9, a scatter plot of skewness and excess kurtosis characteristics is presented. It is 
noticeable that most of the hedge funds possess a more negative skewness and/or positive 
excess kurtosis as compared to the equities. This is consistent with earlier research; see for 
instance Amin and Kat (2003). The Event Driven strategies stand out, in particular the event 
driven Distressed. It reveals the highest excess kurtosis and most negative skewness of all the 
indices. Managed Futures and Equity Market Neutral are the only strategies showing a 
slightly positive skewness and negative excess kurtosis 
 
As mentioned earlier, investors dislike negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis, since 
it causes a higher probability of extreme losses. It is therefore important not to draw hasty 
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conclusions only based upon mean and volatility characteristics discussed previously. The 
image of most of the hedge fund strategies changes when taking into account the often 
disregarded third and fourth central moments of the return distribution.  
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Figure 9: Skewness and excess kurtosis characteristics. Funds marked with * are subcategories of Event Driven. 
N=122. 
 
9.2.3 Outliers 
To see how hedge funds are affected by extreme market conditions, we have compared the 
returns of the indices with the stock market.  
 
The Russian crisis in 1998 substantially affected the financial market. All of the indices have, 
with only one exception, their minimum return observation in either August or October 1998. 
The exception is Managed Futures, which seems unaffected by the Russian crisis. This is 
most likely due to the different sources of return of Managed Futures as compared to equities. 
The strategy of Dedicated Short Bias is to profit on market declines, and its maximum 
observation is in August 1998. Five of the hedge fund indices also have their maximum 
observations in December 1999, in the period of the dot.com bubble. This is the Credit Suisse 
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Index, Emerging Markets, the event driven Multi-Strategy, Global Macro and Long/Short 
Equity. 
 
Observations like those of August and October 1998, as well as December 1999, can be 
considered outliers since they depart from the pattern of the majority of returns. Outliers 
highly affect the results of the analysis, but they should not be removed as they represent the 
behaviour of the hedge fund indices. However, it is interesting to observe how much the 
results are affected by outliers. When August 1998 is removed from the data sample, excess 
kurtosis decrease considerably and skewness becomes more positive. Appendix 2 shows the 
summary statistics of the indices with this month removed. This tells us that hedge funds are 
affected by macroeconomic events, and it may eliminate some of their diversification 
benefits. 
 
9.4 Correlation  
Hedge funds claim to be independent of general market movements. This may be used by 
investors for diversification purposes of portfolios. In order to get a better overview of the 
strength of the relationship between hedge funds and traditional assets, we have calculated the 
correlation coefficients.  They are also calculated within the different hedge fund strategies.  
 
According to Lhabitant (2004), it is important to be careful when using the correlation 
coefficient as an indicator of the strength of relationship between two variables. One pitfall 
can be to interpret correlation as a causal relationship. The focus should be on the co-
occurrence between the two variables. Correlation also only measures the strength of a linear 
relationship. Non-linear relationships are not captured. This is important to keep in mind 
when analyzing indices of hedge funds which have non-linear risk-return payoffs. Another 
aspect is the presence of outliers, which can bias the results.  
 
The correlation coefficients were calculated using the Spearman’s rank correlation. This is 
because hedge funds usually are not characterized by normal distributions. Spearman’s rank 
correlation is also less sensitive to outliers. Still, Pearson’s correlation coefficients were 
calculated for us to observe the difference (see appendix 3). Overall the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients showed somewhat higher correlation of hedge funds with equities than when 
using Spearman.  
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9.4.1 Correlation of Hedge Fund Indices with Traditional Assets  
Several researchers have studied the correlation between hedge funds and other asset classes.  
Brooks and Kat (2002) find that hedge fund indices’ correlation with bonds is low and often 
negative, with the exception of Macro and Equity Market Neutral. On the contrary, the 
correlation with stock markets is high, here with the exception of Convertible Arbitrage and 
Equity Market Neutral.  
 
The correlation between the hedge fund strategies and the traditional assets are shown in table 
2, panel A. Overall, we can observe a low to medium correlation between hedge fund indices 
and equity indices.  All hedge fund strategies, except Convertible Arbitrage and Managed 
Futures, are significantly correlated to MSCI Emerging Market. The Emerging Market index 
is most positively correlated (0,83). This reflects the nature of this strategy, which is to invest 
in emerging markets securities like for instance equities. The other strategies show a low to 
medium correlation with this index. 
 
The Convertible Arbitrage index does not show significant correlation with any of the equity 
indices. This is probably because this strategy is characterized by less equity market risk. 
Managed Futures is another strategy which does not show any significant correlation with 
equities, but as expected a positive correlation with the commodity index S&P GSCI. Along 
with the Long/Short Equity, it is the only index revealing a significant positive correlation 
with the commodity index. Several of the strategies are also correlated with NASDAQ, in 
particular Long/Short Equity (0,70). This point towards investments in stocks of technology 
companies during this period. Dedicated Short Bias shows a negative correlation with all of 
the equity indices, making it attractive for investors when the market is declining. 
 
None of the indices reveal correlation with the Lehman Global Aggregated bond index. 
However, several of the hedge fund indices reveal a low to moderate correlation with the 
Lehman US High-Yield bond index. Distressed is the index with the highest correlation 
coefficient (0,56). This possibly reflects some credit exposure. Equity Market Neutral, Global 
Macro and Managed Futures are the only hedge funds not showing any correlation to this 
bond index. 
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Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients  
 January 1998 – February 2008 
MSCI MSCI S&P S&P Leh. Glob Leh. US 
  EM World NASDAQ 500 GSCI Aggr. High-Yield 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Indices             
Convertible Arbitrage 0,11 0,15 0,14 0,13 0,02 -0,08 0,33 
Dedicated Short Bias     -0,65 -0,79 -0,82 -0,79 -0,05 0,01 -0,50 
Emerging Markets       0,83 0,66 0,54 0,56 0,16 -0,05 0,41 
Equity Market Neut.   0,29 0,34 0,16 0,27 0,12 0,05 0,07 
Event Driven          0,63 0,61 0,58 0,52 0,12 -0,05 0,55 
       - Distressed       0,51 0,52 0,52 0,45 0,02 -0,09 0,56 
       - Multi-Strategy     0,64 0,60 0,54 0,52 0,15 -0,04 0,49 
       - Risk Arbitrage 0,49 0,46 0,37 0,39 0,10 0,06 0,28 
 Fixed Income Arb. 0,19 0,17 0,13 0,14 0,16 0,13 0,23 
Global Macro 0,22 0,14 0,09 0,08 0,13 0,10 0,11 
 Long/Short Equity 0,68 0,74 0,70 0,66 0,20 0,07 0,42 
Managed Futures 0,09 0,03 -0,04 -0,02 0,25 0,30 0,02 
Multi-Strategy 0,42 0,50 0,37 0,39 0,09 0,11 0,42 
CS/Tremont Index 0,64 0,64 0,57 0,54 0,18 0,05 0,48 
Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes 
    
    
  
MSCI EM. 1             
MSCI World 0,77 1           
NASDAQ 0,66 0,83 1         
S&P 500 0,69 0,95 0,86 1       
S&P GSCI 0,15 0,02 0,02 -0,07 1     
Lehman Global Aggr. -0,06 -0,01 -0,15 -0,10 0,15 1   
Leh. US High-Yield 0,41 0,43 0,42 0,43 -0,02 0,14 1 
 
Table 2: Spearman’s correlation coefficients between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies and traditional assets 
(panel A) and Spearman’s correlation coefficients between traditional assets (panel B). Significance is in bold, 
and tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. N=122. 
 
9.4.2 Correlation within Hedge Fund Index Strategies 
In table 3, the correlation between the various hedge fund strategy indices is summarized. 
Managed Futures and Global Macro show little correlation with the other indices. This is 
noteworthy since these also were of the strategies less correlated with traditional assets. The 
strategy of Dedicated Short Bias, which was negatively correlated with all equity indices, is 
also negatively correlated with the other hedge fund strategies. 
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Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients  
January 1998 – February 2008 
  a b c d e f G h i j k l M n 
Convertible Arb.          a 1                           
Ded. Short Bias          b -0,24 1                         
Emerging Markets              c 0,22 -0,57 1                       
Equity Market Neut.         d 0,34 -0,24 0,27 1                     
    - Event Driven                       e 0,52 -0,64 0,63 0,32 1                   
    - Distressed                          f 0,44 -0,59 0,51 0,24 0,90 1                 
    - Multi-Strategy                    g 0,53 -0,59 0,66 0,33 0,93 0,71 1               
Risk Arbitrage h 0,41 -0,42 0,50 0,42 0,57 0,43 0,59 1             
 Fixed Income Arb. I 0,44 -0,20 0,28 0,29 0,46 0,41 0,45 0,29 1           
Global Macro j 0,15 -0,14 0,40 0,17 0,28 0,17 0,32 0,26 0,28 1         
 Long/Short Equity k 0,24 -0,71 0,63 0,34 0,69 0,55 0,71 0,54 0,30 0,32 1       
Managed Futures l -0,04 -0,09 0,63 0,05 0,11 0,11 0,06 0,01 0,09 0,39 0,20 1     
Multi-Strategy m 0,56 -0,45 0,41 0,32 0,60 0,46 0,63 0,36 0,34 0,24 0,55 0,15 1   
CS/Tremon Index n 0,35 -0,60 0,71 0,29 0,77 0,62 0,80 0,54 0,42 0,59 0,88 0,27 0,62 1 
  
Table 3: Spearman’s correlation coefficients between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies.  Significance of the 
correlation coefficient is in bold. It is tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. N=122. 
 
 
9.4.3 Correlation in Bull and Bear Markets 
Caglayan and Edwards (2001) did a research on hedge funds’ correlation in bull and bear 
markets in the period of January 1990 to August 1998. They found a higher positive 
correlation of hedge funds with stock indices in bear markets. In bull markets the correlation 
was lower. 
 
We have studied the correlation of hedge fund strategies and traditional assets in bull and bear 
markets of MSCI World in the period of January 1998 to February 2008. A bull market is 
defined as when the MSCI World index goes up, and a bear market is defined as when it goes 
down. Of the period analysed, we have observed 51 bear months and 71 bull months. Figure 
10 graphically presents the correlation in bull and bear markets.  
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Figure 10: Correlation of CF/Tremont strategy indices with MSCI World in bear and bull markets. 
Number of bull months is 71, and number of bear months is 51.  
 
By large, the correlation seems to be lower in bear than in bull markets. This is good for 
investors seeking diversification. The exceptions are Emerging Markets, Long/Short Equity, 
the CS/Tremont Index and Managed Futures. The latter now reveals a negative correlation in 
bear markets. Dedicated Short Bias shows an inverse correlation with MSCI World both in 
bull and bear market. The correlation is somewhat less negative in bear markets. 
 
In appendix 4 a full overview of the correlation between the various indices in bull and bear 
markets of MSCI World is presented. In bull markets, the strategies in general show 
significant correlation with MSCI Emerging Markets. In bear markets the amount of hedge 
funds revealing a significant correlation with equities is more diverse. Managed Futures and 
Convertible Arbitrage does not show any significant correlation with the traditional indices in 
bull markets. Managed Futures overall shows a negative correlation with equities in bear 
markets, and this is also the only time it shows significant correlation with S&P GSCI. In bear 
markets, nearly all of the hedge fund indices are correlated with Lehman Global US High-
Yield. Global Macro is the only index not showing any significant correlation with the 
indices.  
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Pearson’s correlation in appendix 5 shows, opposite of what found using Spearman, an overall 
higher correlation with stocks in bear than bull markets. With the other asset classes, the 
correlation in bull and bear does not differ considerably. 
 
As a comparison, the correlation of traditional indices with MSCI World is shown in figure 
11. The correlation with stocks is high as compared to the different hedge fund strategy 
indices. The correlation coefficients of S&P GSCI and Lehman Global Aggregated, on the 
other hand, are not significant. Lehman US High-Yield only shows significant correlation in 
bear markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Correlation of traditional assets with MSCI World in bear and bull market. Number 
of bull months is 71, and number of bear months is 51.  
 
 
9.4.4 A Summary of Correlation 
Hedge funds claim not to be effected by market movements. According to our observations 
this is not the case for most of the indices. This is consistent with the result of Brooks and Kat 
(2002). They point out that the situation perhaps would be different if only individual funds 
were considered. However, investors usually invest in a basket of funds. On the contrary to 
research done by Caglayan and Edwards (2001), our observations tell us that the correlation 
with equities is higher in bull and lower in bear markets for most strategies. This diverging 
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result may be due to the different periods analysed. The methodology used to measure the 
correlation is another possible cause. 
 
9.5 Performance Measurements 
In table 4 we have used the various performance measures presented in chapter 5, in order to 
rank the hedge fund and traditional indices. It is also done to see if the rankings will differ 
among the performance measures.  
 
The table shows that the various measures provide different ranking. Still, it is notable that the 
best and worsted ranked indices are the same, regardless of which performance measure used. 
Overall, the performance measures rank hedge funds higher than the traditional assets. The 
exception is Dedicated Short Bias, which has the poorest ranking among both hedge funds 
and traditional assets. On the contrary, Equity Market Neutral is ranked superior to all of the 
other indices, regardless of the measure applied.  
 
It is noteworthy that the Lehman Global Aggregated bond index improves its ranking 
considerably when a threshold of τ=0 is used in the performance measures of Omega, Sortino 
and Kappa3. It is then ranked better than several of the hedge fund indices. This bond index 
has relatively few observations below zero, but the amount over the threshold of the risk-free 
rate is also low. Hence, the frequency of returns over the threshold increases when lowering it 
to zero. The ranking of these measures can therefore change significantly, depending on the 
given threshold and the characteristics of the return distribution. The probability of return 
over the risk free rate of return (T-Bill) is thus higher among hedge funds than the bond-
indices. This is also likely due to the higher volatility and extreme values among hedge funds. 
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Table 4: Annualized performance measurement for CS/Tremont indices and various indices. Omega, Kappa3 and 
Sortino is calculated for two different thresholds (τ); zero and risk-free rate of return (T-bill). The ranking of 
each fund is marked in red. N = 122. 
 
 
9.5.1 Rank Correlation 
Table 5 presents the rank correlation among the performance measures we have used. It tells 
us that the ranking do not differ considerably. The measure showing a somewhat lower 
correlation is Kappa3 when the threshold is zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
Annualized Performance Measurements 
January 1998 – February 2008  
Sharpe  Mod. AR Adj. Omega  Sortino Kappa3 
  Ratio SR SR τ=0 τ=rf τ=0 τ=rf τ=0 τ=rf 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Indices 
               
Convertible Arb. 0,92    7 0,31    6 0,66     9 2,24   9 2,04   7 1,49   8 1,34   8 0,94   4 0,86   4 
Ded.  Short Bias -0,23  21 -0,15  21 -0,21   21 0,83 21 0,84 21 -0,36 21 -0,34 21 -0,29 21 -0,28 21 
Emerging Markets 0,43  12 0,13  15 0,36   15 1,46 16 1,42 12 0,60 16 0,58 14 0,35 17 0,34 15 
Equity Market Neut 2,78    1 0,92    1 2,21     1 24,29   1 10,06   1 18,00  1 10,08   1 9,70   1 6,06   1 
Event Driven 1,10    4 0,28    9 0,88     4 2,89   4 2,54   4 1,53   7 1,43   5 0,78   9 0,75   8 
    - Distressed 1,18    3 0,30    8 0,95     3 3,33   3 2,72   3 1,72   4 1,55   3 0,85   8 0,80   7 
    - Multi-Strategy 0,93    6 0,26  10 0,75     7 2,54   5 2,35   5 1,38 10 1,35   7 0,74   10 0,73   9 
    - Risk Arbitrage 0,76  10 0,47    2 0,62   10 2,20 10 1,88 10 1,31 11 1,16 10 0,73 11 0,68   10 
Fixed Income Arb 0,39  16 0,11  16 0,30   16 1,53 13 1,40 13 0,52 18 0,47 16 0,29 18 0,27 16 
Global Macro 0,97    5 0,31    5 0,81     5 2,49   6 2,27   6 1,60   5 1,48   4 0,92   5 0,88   3 
Long/Short Equity 0,79    9 0,32    4 0,70     8 2,09 11 1,93   9 1,45   9 1,34   9 0,88   7 0,84   6 
Managed Futures 0,43  13 0,20  12 0,39   13 1,40 17 1,36 15 0,74 15 0,69 12 0,55 14 0,53 12 
Multi-Strategy 1,40    2 0,43    3 1,19     2 3,73   2 2,91   2 2,65   2 2,28   2 1,49   3 1,35   2 
CS/Tremont Index 0,83    8 0,31    7 0,76    6 2,30   8 2,01   8 1,53   6 1,36   6 0,91   6 0,84   5 
Panel B:  Stock Indices         
MSCI Emerg. Mark 0,41  14 0,16  14 0,38   14 1,51 14 1,36  14 0,79  14 0,57  15 0,53  15 0,39  14 
MSCI World 0,14  19 0,06  19 0,13   19 1,32 18 1,11  19 0,54  17 0,19  19 0,38  16 0,13  19 
NASDAQ 0,15  18 0,07  18 0,14   18 1,23 19 1,12  18 0,39  19 0,21  18 0,28  19 0,15  18 
S&P500 -0,02  20 -0,01  20 -0,02   20 1,17 20 0,99  20 0,29  20 -0,03  20 0,20  20 -0,02  20 
Panel C: Commodity Index                 
S&P GSCI 0,40  15 0,19  13 0,39   12 1,48 15 1,33  16 0,92  13 0,63  13 0,70  13 0,49  13 
Panel D: Bond Indices 
                
Lehman Glob. Agg. 0,55  11 0,25  11 0,49   11 2,38   7 1,48  11 2,30    3 0,91 11 1,64    2 0,68  11 
Lehman US High-Y 0,25  17 0,10  17 0,23   17 1,74 12 1,22  17 1,07  12 0,35 17 0,71  12 0,24  17 
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Spearman’s Rank correlation 
January 1998 - February 2008 
  A b c d e f g h i 
Sharpe Ratio a 1                 
Modified Sharpe ratio b 0,888 1               
AR-adjusted Sharpe ratio c 0,982 0,901 1             
Omega t=0 d 0,939 0,817 0,938 1           
Omega t=rf e 0,990 0,868 0,966 0,953 1         
Sortino t=0 f 0,900 0,844 0,918 0,938 0,879 1       
Sortino t=rf g 0,988 0,904 0,995 0,932 0,970 0,917 1     
Kappa3 t=0 h 0,847 0,855 0,861 0,875 0,823 0,970 0,866 1   
Kappa3 t=rf i 0,944 0,945 0,953 0,871 0,922 0,903 0,962 0,909 1 
 
Table 5: Spearman’s rank correlation for the various performance measures in the period January 1998 to 
February 2008. Significance of the correlation coefficient is in bold. It is tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% 
significance level. N=122.  
 
Several researchers, for instance Brooks and Kat (2002) and Sharma (2004), point out that the 
Sharpe ratio is not an adequate risk-adjusted performance measure when evaluating hedge 
fund returns. When ranking the funds, we would therefore expect the Sharpe ratio to be less 
correlated with ranking of the alternative measures. Eling and Schumacher (2005, 2007) 
analyzed the correlation between the ranking of individual funds (2007) and of hedge fund 
indices (2005) using various performance measures. They found a high correlation between 
the rankings of the performance measures. This is coherent with our observations, and may 
indicate that the choice of performance measure is less critical than believed by many when 
ranking hedge funds. 
 
9.6 Autocorrelation 
Several researchers like Kat and Lu (2002) and Okunev and White (2003) have revealed 
significant serial correlations in returns of hedge funds, then mainly first order 
autocorrelation. We therefore chose to test for first order autocorrelation in the return series. 
A Ljung-Box test of third order serial correlation was also performed. Table 6 presents the 
first order autocorrelation coefficients as well as the Ljung-Box Q(3) statistics for the hedge 
fund indices and the traditional assets.  
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Table 6 a) and 6 b): Test of autocorrelation in the return series of the CS/Tremont indices  (6 a)) and 
the various traditional assets (6 b)); panel A: Stock indices, panel B: Commodity indices and panel 
C: Bond indices. AR(1) is the first order autocorrelation of returns. Q(3) is the statistics of the 
Ljung-Box test. Significance are in bold at 1%* and 5% level. N=122. 
 
As table 6 shows, there is evidence of autocorrelation in our findings. Most of the strategies 
show positive first-order autocorrelation. The Q(3)-statistics for the Ljung-Box test show that 
several of these indices have to reject the null hypothesis that all of the three first 
autocorrelation coefficients are jointly zero, but this can be due to the first order 
autocorrelation. This means that at least one of the coefficients is significantly different from 
zero. The traditional assets do not show any evidence of significant autocorrelation. This is 
expected, as they operate in more liquid and efficient markets. The exception is Lehman 
Global Aggregate, where the null hypothesis of the Ljung-Box test is rejected. This can be 
due to second or third order autocorrelation.  
 
The consequence of autocorrelation can be undervaluation of volatility and hence 
overvaluation of risk-adjusted performance measures. As earlier mentioned, a likely reason 
for the presence of autocorrelation in returns is that funds are operating in illiquid markets. It 
can create an illiquidity bias, as presented in chapter 7.5. Another reason for autocorrelation, 
according to Getmansky et al. (2003), may be performance smoothing. This implies reporting 
only parts of the positive return in order to offset potential future losses. The managers 
thereby reduce volatility, and improve the results of risk-adjusted performance measures such 
CS/Tremont Indices AR(1) Q(3) 
Convertible Arbitrage 0,51* 33,29* 
Dedicated Short Bias 0,12 2,46 
Emerging Markets 0,23 8,42 
Equity Market Neutral 0,32* 13,86* 
Event Driven 0,30* 11,52* 
        - Distressed 0,28* 9,37 
        - Multi-Strategy 0,29* 10,77 
        - Risk-Arbitrage 0,27* 13,01* 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0,36* 27,97* 
Global Macro 0,24* 7,66 
Long/Short Equity 0,13 2,62 
Managed Futures 0,12 5,54 
Multi-Strategy 0,21* 6,77 
CS/Tremont Index 0,11 2,19 
Traditional Assets Classes AR(1) Q(3) 
Panel A: Stock Indices 
MSCI Emerging Markets 0,09 1,20 
MSCI World 0,10 3,27 
NASDAQ 0,05 0,36 
S&P 500 0,03 1,69 
Panel B: Commodity Index 
S&P GSCI  0,03 6,12 
Panel C: Bond Indices  
Lehman Global Aggreg. 0,14 8,22 
Lehman US High Yield 0,15 4,95 
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as the Sharpe ratio. This is mainly a concern for funds containing illiquid assets, since 
performance smoothing is difficult for liquid securities which can easily be marked to market.   
 
Convertible Arbitrage is the strategy with the highest first order autocorrelation of returns. 
The line fit plot in figure 12 makes it easier to see this relationship graphically. Convertible 
Arbitrage (a) is compared to the stock index S&P500 (b), which has the lowest first order 
autocorrelation.   
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Figure 12 a) and 12 b): First order autocorrelation for Convertible Arbitrage and S&P 500. N=122.  
 
9.6.1 Returns Adjusted for Autocorrelation 
Lo (2002) has documented that positive autocorrelation can lead to overestimation of the 
Sharpe ratio. We examined if the presence of autocorrelation affected our results. Following 
the method described in equation 3.14, we calculated the unsmoothed return series of the 
CS/Tremont indices and the various traditional assets.  
 
The summary statistics and performance measures for these unsmoothed returns are shown in 
appendix 8 and 9. The standard deviation increased for all the indices, consistent with the 
results of Brooks and Kat (2002). The mean returns are the same, aside from some small 
rounding errors. This indicates that the autocorrelation leads to underestimation of the 
volatility. This is shown in figure 13, where we compare the smoothed and unsmoothed return 
of the hedge fund index which revealed the highest first order autocorrelation; Convertible 
Arbitrage. The figure clearly depicts the underestimation of volatility. 
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Figure 13: Smoothed and unsmoothed return of  Convertible Arbitrage in the period January 1998 to February 
2008. N = 122. 
 
If we compare the performance measures before and after calculating unsmoothed returns, we 
see that the rankings have changed. Some of the indices which had significant autocorrelation, 
like for instance Convertible Arbitrage, are now ranked lower. However, the differences are 
not large. The values for the measures have overall decreased, in particular for the Sharpe 
ratio. The Sharpe ratios of the unsmoothed returns are, as expected, very close to the 
autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratios of the original returns. As compared to the traditional 
asset classes, the ranking still favours the smoothed hedge fund indices. 
 
 
Correlation of the hedge fund indices with other asset classes can also be affected by 
autocorrelation. In appendix 10 the unsmoothed return’s correlation with stock, commodity 
and bond indices are presented. Convertible Arbitrage was, as mentioned, the strategy 
showing the highest first order autocorrelation. It now shows significant correlation with 
several of the stock indices. Its correlation with MSCI Emerging Markets has increased from 
0,11 to 0,21. Other hedge fund indices which showed significant first-order autocorrelation, 
now reveal a somewhat higher correlation with the stock indices.  
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A benefit of hedge funds is known to be diversification. However, it is important to be aware 
of the possible presence of autocorrelation. It can disguise significant correlation with other 
asset classes. 
 
It should be mentioned that we have only removed the first order autocorrelation. According 
to Okunev and White (2003) this is unsatisfying if the hedge funds reveal significant 
autocorrelation beyond first order.   
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10.0 Empirical Results of Norwegian Hedge Funds and 
CS/Tremont (Jan.04-Feb.08) 
In this chapter we will present the empirical findings of the analysis of the period January 
2004 to February 2008. For CS/Tremont, we will compare the results with those of the longer 
period. In addition, we will analyse individual Norwegian hedge funds. This will be related to 
the analysis of the appropriate strategy indices of CS/Tremont as well as traditional indices. 
We will start by giving an overview of the development of the shorter period analyzed. 
 
10.1 An Overview of the Development  
The shorter period analyzed is mainly characterized by bull markets. No severe crises have 
affected the stock market. The exception is the recession in the US economy which stroke the 
world’s financial markets at the end of 2007.  
 
10.1.1 CS/Tremont Indices 
As we can se from figure 6 in chapter 9.1, the CS/Tremont indices are mainly characterized 
by an overall upward trend since 2004. The exception is, as before, Dedicated Short Bias.  
 
10.1.2 Individual Norwegian Hedge Funds 
Figure 14 shows the development of $100 since January 2004. The Norwegian funds have 
some of the same pattern as the general stock market, with a decline at the end of 2007. 
WarrenWicklund Diversified, which follows a multi-strategy, yields the highest return. The 
fund with the second highest payoff is Sector Maritime Investment, which follows a 
long/short equity strategy. The two funds of funds FMG Bio-Med and FMG Global have the 
lowest return. A reason for this may be that as funds of funds they charge extra fees, and these 
figures are net of all fees.  
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Growth of $100 since 2004
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Figure 13: The development of $100 for individual Norwegian hedge funds in the period January 2004 to 
February 2008.  N=50. 
 
10.2 Summary Statistics  
Table 7 presents the summary statistics for the CS/Tremont indices and the individual 
Norwegian hedge funds as compared to the traditional indices for the period January 2004 to 
February 2008. We will discuss our main findings in the following sections.   
 
10.2.1 The First Two Moments of the Return Distribution 
In this first part we will analyze the two first moments of the return distribution, the mean and 
variance, of the CS/Tremont indices and the individual Norwegian hedge funds.  
 
10.2.1.1 CS/Tremont Indices 
All of the CS/Tremont indices show a positive mean return. Most of the strategies have a 
lower mean and standard deviation than they had in the period of January 1998 to February 
2008. However, the difference is relatively small. The standard deviations are lower than for 
the stock and commodity indices, while there differences in the overall mean return are not 
large. The exception is the stock indices MSCI Emerging Markets and MSCI Norway. They 
have a mean superior to those of the CS/Tremont indices, but also higher volatility. The bond 
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indices show, as expected, overall lower return and standard deviation than the CS/Tremont 
and traditional indices. This could be due to different market conditions in the periods 
analyzed. 
Summary Statistics  
Monthly Return January 2004 – February 2008 
  Exc. Jarque- 
  
Mean SD Min Max Skewn. Kurt. Bera 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Index         
    
Convertible Arbitrage 0,33 1,14 -3,13 2,75 -0,62 0,60 3,98 
Dedicated Short Bias 0,30 3,87 -7,71 10,31 0,46 -0,02 1,73 
Emerging Markets 1,31 2,21 -5,02 5,76 -0,72 0,78 5,61 
Equity Market Neutral 0,67 0,57 -0,39 2,13 0,43 0,16 1,61 
Event Driven 0,96 1,23 -2,44 3,27 -0,68 1,05 6,15 
        - Distressed 0,94 0,98 -1,73 2,67 -0,72 0,92 6,13 
        - Multi-Strategy 1,00 1,52 -3,10 4,31 -0,51 1,23 5,30 
        - Risk-Arbitrage 0,52 0,92 -1,52 3,22 0,72 1,56 9,35* 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0,38 0,79 -1,96 2,05 -0,53 0,59 3,04 
Global Macro 1,10 1,23 -0,86 4,44 0,85 0,90 7,66 
Long/Short Equity 0,91 1,83 -4,05 4,18 -0,57 -0,22 2,84 
Managed Futures 0,65 3,40 -6,46 6,89 -0,10 -0,92 1,83 
Multi-Strategy 0,72 1,12 -1,81 3,02 -0,14 -0,52 0,71 
CS/Tremont Index 0,84 1,23 -1,53 3,23 -0,22 -0,58 1,11 
Panel B: Norwegian Hedge Funds             
Discovery                           a 0,67 2,65 -4,76 7,62 0,21 -0,15 0,41 
FMG Bio-Med                   d 0,33 2,15 -6,48 4,19 -0,76 0,79 6,17 
FMG Global                       d 0,40 2,16 -8,00 3,05 -1,49 3,33 41,7* 
Interkraft Energy                b 1,05 3,01 -7,51 7,90 -0,20 0,45 0,77 
Nordic Alpha                      a 1,16 2,89 -5,86 8,11 -0,20 0,23 0,45 
Sector Maritime                  a 1,58 3,54 -5,84 10,68 0,26 -0,28 0,72 
WW Diversified                 c 2,08 3,48 -5,91 13,07 0,14 1,22 3,28 
WW MultiStrategy             d 0,98 2,69 -4,33 7,07 0,33 -0,59 1,66 
WW Nordic Hedge I          c 0,84 2,62 -4,46 6,67 0,14 -0,67 1,10 
Average 1,01 2,10 -3,95 6,04 -0,06 0,01 0,03 
Panel C: Stock Indices               
MSCI Emerging Markets 2,11 5,46 -12,59 11,02 -0,68 0,38 4,13 
MSCI World 0,72 2,61 -7,71 5,09 -0,81 0,86 6,95 
MSCI Norway 2,41 6,78 -21,07 14,20 -0,64 1,52 8,19 
NASDAQ 0,33 4,00 -9,89 7,63 -0,40 -0,31 1,56 
S&P 500  0,36 2,42 -6,31 4,24 -0,61 -0,14 3,19 
Panel D: Commodity Index             
S&P GSCI 1,43 6,30 -10,71 15,14 -0,20 -0,49 0,83 
Panel E: Bond Indices             
Lehman Global Aggregate 0,49 1,40 -3,66 2,78 -0,50 -0,06 2,09 
Lehman High-Yield 0,48 1,36 -3,54 2,62 -1,08 0,73 10,88* 
Table 7: Summary statistics January 2004 to February 2008. Significance are in bold at 1%* and 5% level. 
Strategies for Norwegian funds: a = long/short equity, b = managed futures, c = multi-strategy and d = funds of 
funds. N = 50. 
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10.2.1.2 Individual Norwegian Hedge Funds 
The mean-variance characteristics of the Norwegian funds are presented in figure 14. The 
characteristics of the associated CS/Tremont indices as well as the indices for stocks, bonds 
and commodities, are also presented. 
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Figure 14: Mean-variance characteristics of Norwegian hedge funds and various indices 2004-2008. N = 50. 
 
As presented in the figure, WarrenWicklund Diversified and Sector Maritime Investment 
deviate from the other Norwegian funds, with higher monthly mean return and standard 
deviation. Two of the three Norwegian funds that follow a long/short equity strategy, Nordic 
Alpha and Sector Maritime, have a higher mean return than the Long/Short Equity index of 
CS/Tremont. However, as expected do both exhibit a higher standard deviation than the 
index. Interkraft Energy, the managed futures fund, appears to have superior mean-variance 
characteristics to the Managed Futures index of CS/Tremont. WarrenWicklund Diversified 
shows higher mean return than the related CS/Tremont Multi-Strategy index. However, the 
volatility is also higher. The other multi-strategy fund, WarrenWicklund Nordic, shows a 
poorer risk-return relationship than the index.  
 
By large, the Norwegian hedge funds have higher mean return than the associated 
CS/Tremont indices, but they are usually followed by higher volatility. This is expected, since 
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we are comparing indices with individual funds. High and low mean and standard deviation 
even each other out for the indices, since they represent a large number of individual funds. 
Funds of funds are not part of the CS/Tremont database. Hence, the Norwegian funds of funds 
are not directly comparable with any CS/Tremont index, but the two FMG funds exhibit poor 
mean-variance characteristics. The Norwegian hedge funds show lower standard deviation 
than the main share of the stock indices and the commodity index. With the exception of the 
FMG funds, the Norwegian funds have both higher mean and volatility than the bond indices. 
 
10.2.2 The Third and Fourth Moment of the Return Distribution 
The third and fourth moment of the CS/Tremont indices and the Norwegian hedge funds will 
be discussed in the following sections.  
 
10.2.2.1 CS/Tremont Indices 
According to the Jarque-Bera test, a large part of the CS/Tremont hedge fund indices are 
normally distributed. This was not the case in the extended period. Although, it should be 
mentioned that our sample data size is rather small and it should therefore not be drawn hasty 
conclusions. It is difficult to detect non-normality of small sample sizes such as our own, 
since the Jarque-Bera test is more convenient for larger sample sizes.. 
 
The majority of the CS/Tremont indices show a negative skewness. This was also the case in 
the longer period, but it is less negative for most of the indices. This indicates that the 
likelihood of small gains and large losses has decreased, but the return distributions still have 
a somewhat longer negative tail. During the extended period, most of the indices had positive 
excess kurtosis. In the shorter period, the excess kurtosis has decreased considerably for a 
large parte of the indices. The values for Distressed have decreased from over 20 to around 1. 
A likely explanation is the more diverse market conditions of the longer period. 
 
The CS/Tremont indices are not superior to the various traditional indices concerning 
skewness and excess kurtosis. They all show a slightly negative skewness, and most of them 
have positive excess kurtosis. 
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10.2.2.2 Individual Norwegian Hedge Funds 
FMG Global is the only Norwegian hedge fund, according to the Jarque-Bera test, which is 
not normally distributed. This fund has the lowest skewness and highest excess kurtosis of all 
the funds and indices. However, we should again take into consideration the small data 
sample. 
 
The skewness and excess kurtosis of the Norwegian funds overall do not differ much from 
those of either the CS/Tremont indices or the various traditional assets. Discovery, Sector 
Maritime, WW Multi-Strategy and WW Nordic Hedge show a slightly positive skewness and 
negative excess kurtosis. 
 
Figure 16 graphically illustrates the skewness and excess kurtosis characteristics for the 
Norwegian funds, their related CS/Tremont indices as well as the traditional indices. The 
figure shows that, with a few a few exceptions, they are not centred far from zero.  
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Figure 15: Skewness and excess kurtosis characteristics for Norwegian funds, CS/Tremont indices and various 
traditional indices. N=50. 
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10.2.3 Outliers 
There are some extreme monthly returns which deviate from the general pattern. These are 
outliers but, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, they characterize the behaviour of hedge 
funds. The period has been characterized by bull markets. However, the recession of the US 
economy may have showed its effect on the world’s stock market in January 2008. All of the 
stock indices have their minimum return in this month. Three of the CS/Tremont indices have 
its minimum return in January. This is Long/Short Equity, Multi-Strategy and Event Driven 
(though none of the underlying categories of Event Driven have their minimum return in this 
month). Several other strategies also show negative return in this month. The exceptions are, 
as we could assume, Dedicated Short Bias, Equity Market Neutral, Managed Futures, Fixed 
Income Arbitrage and Global Macro. 
 
A majority of the individual Norwegian hedge funds also have their minimum return in this 
month. These are WW Diversified, WW Nordic Hedge, Nordic Alpha, FMG Bio-Med and 
FMG Global. The only funds showing a positive return in January 2008 is Interkraft Energy 
and WW Multi-Strategy. Interkraft Energy is probably not affected since it trades in the 
futures market, which shows low correlation with the stock market. 
. 
10.3 Correlation 
In this chapter we will present the correlation of the CS/Tremont indices and individual 
Norwegian hedge funds with the traditional indices. As mentioned before, the shorter period 
of our analysis is mainly characterized by an upward trend and bull markets. Of the 50 
observed months, 32 can be characterized as bull and 18 as bear markets. We have therefore 
only studied the overall correlation, and not the correlation in bull and bear months. 
 
10.3.1 CS/Tremont Indices 
The correlation of CS/Tremont with the traditional stock indices is presented in table 8. 
The correlation with MSCI Emerging Markets, MSCI World and S&P 500 is medium to high 
for a majority of the hedge fund indices. Fixed Income Arbitrage and Equity Market Neutral 
show a fairly lower correlation with these indices. Dedicated Short Bias shows a medium to 
high negative correlation. A possible explanation for the higher correlation in the shorter 
period of our analysis is that the period is mainly characterized by a bull market.  As shown in 
chapter 9, correlation seems to be fairly higher in bull than bear market when using 
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Spearman’s rank correlation. It can be that the longer period provides a better picture of the 
correlation, since it consists of various conditions of the  markets.  
 
Spearman's Correlation Coefficients 
January 2004 - February 2008 
MSCI MSCI  NASDAQ S&P  S&P Leh.Glob Leh.US 
  EM World   500 GSCI Aggr.  High-Yield 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Indices              
CS/Tremont Index 0,84 0,87 0,61 0,67 0,22 0,10 0,41 
Convertible Arbitrage 0,40 0,53 0,37 0,44 -0,04 -0,04 0,43 
Dedicated Short Bias -0,57 -0,74 -0,78 -0,75 0,07 -0,15 -0,59 
 Emerging Markets 0,89 0,72 0,44 0,46 0,30 0,25 0,37 
Equity Market Neutral 0,42 0,31 -0,07 0,07 0,23 0,20 0,04 
Event Driven 0,75 0,84 0,64 0,68 0,14 0,07 0,47 
Distressed 0,60 0,81 0,60 0,65 0,03 -0,04 0,46 
Multi-Strategy 0,75 0,78 0,60 0,64 0,19 0,10 0,43 
Risk Arbitrage 0,65 0,64 0,47 0,46 0,26 0,35 0,39 
 Fixed Income Arb. 0,22 0,43 0,22 0,32 0,23 0,17 0,23 
Global Macro 0,59 0,45 0,17 0,24 0,30 0,15 0,02 
 Long/Short Equity 0,86 0,90 0,67 0,70 0,22 0,13 0,47 
Managed Futures 0,54 0,53 0,45 0,44 0,19 0,10 0,21 
Multi-Strategy 0,68 0,81 0,56 0,63 0,10 0,00 0,44 
Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes   
  
    
  
MSCI EM 1             
MSCI World 0,78 1           
NASDAQ 0,54 0,81 1         
S&P 500 0,57 0,89 0,89 1       
S&P GSCI 0,26 0,00 -0,15 -0,23 1     
Leh. Global Agg 0,18 0,08 -0,06 -0,05 0,12 1   
Leh. US High-Yield 0,34 0,55 0,52 0,63 -0,08 0,17 1 
Table 8: Spearman’s correlation coefficients between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies and traditional assets 
(Panel A). Spearman’s correlation coefficients between traditional assets (Panel B). Significance in bold, tested 
with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. N=50.  
 
10.3.2 Individual Norwegian Hedge Funds 
The individual Norwegian hedge fund’s correlation with traditional assets is shown in the 
table in appendix 9. It primarily tells us that the individual hedge funds reveal a low to 
medium correlation with the traditional assets. As shown in figure 16, the hedge fund showing 
less correlation with the equities is Interkraft Energy. This is probably due to the fact that this 
fund trade in the commodity exchange of electrical power at Nord Pool (The Nordic Power 
Exchange). This market is usually less correlated with the stock market. As compare to the 
associated hedge fund index of CS/Tremont, Managed Futures and Interkraft shows a lower 
correlation to the equities. 
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Figure 16: Correlation of Norwegian hedge funds with traditional assets. N=50. 
 
FMG Global is the fund showing the highest correlation with equities. This is a fund of funds, 
where a large part of the investment is in long/short equity funds in Europe and the US. The 
rest is invested in global multi-strategy funds. This could make them less protected against 
market movements as compared to for instance an equity market neutral strategy. Sector 
Maritime is the fund showing the highest correlation with MSCI Norway (0,44) except from 
FMG Global. This could be a result of the strategy to invest longs/short in important 
industries of Norway, such as shipping. This fund also shows the highest correlation with the 
commodity index S&P GSCI, which could be because the fund trades in commodity markets 
of for instance oil and gas. The other Norwegian hedge funds show a rather low correlation 
with the commodity index. Sector Maritime also have lower correlation with the equities than 
the related Long/Short Equity index of CS/Tremont. Several of the Norwegian hedge funds 
also reveal significant correlations with NASDAQ. Among the hedge funds showing highest 
correlation is FMG Bio-Med (0,37). This may reflect the investment strategy which is to 
invest in funds related to the medical business. 
 
Overall, the individual Norwegian hedge fund is less correlated with traditional assets than the 
indices of CS/Tremont. For investors, this serves well for diversification. Again it should be 
mentioned that it would be preferable to analyse the correlation during a period of more 
diverse market conditions, in order to obtain a more reliable picture.   
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10.4 Performance Measurement  
Annualized Performance Measurement 
January 2004 – February 2008  
Sharpe  Mod. AR Adj. Omega  Sortino Kappa3 
  Ratio SR SR t=0 t=rf T=0 t=rf t=0 t=rf 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Indices   
    
         
Convertible Arb 0,16 28 0,06  28 0,11  28 1,16 31 1,12 29 0,25 31 0,22 28 0,18 31 0,16  28 
Ded Short Bias 0,02 32 0,01  32 0,02  32 1,02 32 1,02 32 0,04 32 0,03 32 0,03 32 0,03  32 
Emerging Markets 1,62   7 0,57    9  1,69    5 3,31 10 3,02   8 3,06 11 2,81   8 2,14 10 1,98    9 
Equity Market N 2,40   1 0,82    2 2,03    1 15,19   1 7,48   1 14,61   1 8,31   1 9,55   1 5,54    2 
Event Driven 1,94   4 0,63    5 1,81    4 5,01   4 4,18   4 4,15   5 3,59   5 2,72   5 2,38    5 
        - Distressed 2,35   2 0,72    3 1,87    3 7,37   3 5,25   3 5,89   3 4,82   3 3,68   3 3,11    3 
        - Multi-Strat 1,65   6 0,57    7 1,67    6 4,00   6 3,49   6 3,36 10 2,99   7 2,21   9 2,00    7 
        - Risk-Arb 0,93 16 0,42  16 0,86  16 2,93  12 2,14 15 2,49 14 1,90 13 1,68 13 1,38  12 
Fixed Income Arb 0,47 25 0,17  26 0,39  25 1,63  22 1,41 25 0,89 24 0,69 25 0,60 25 0,49  25 
Global Macro 2,30   3 0,96    1 1,94    2 10,09    2 6,64   2 11,65   2 7,95   2 8,16   2 5,69    1 
Long/Short Equity 1,19 12 0,45  12 1,08  13 2,52  16 2,27 13 2,32 15 2,06 12 1,63 15 1,48  11 
Managed Futures 0,38 26 0,18  25 0,34  26 1,33  29 1,30 28 0,64 28 0,60 26 0,50 29 0,47  26 
Multi-Strategy 1,37   9 0,52  10 1,09  12 3,54    8 2,75   9 3,45   9 2,76   9 2,39   8 1,98    8 
CS/Tremont Index 1,60   8 0,59    6 1,45    8 3,90    7 3,10   7 4,07   6 3,28   6 0,84 21 0,69  20 
Panel B: Norwegian Hedge Funds               
Discovery Fund 0,51 24 0,24 21  0,43 23 1,86 21 1,44 24 1,60 20 0,86 21 1,22 19 0,67  21 
FMG Bio-Med 0,09 30 0,04 30 0,10 30 1,47 26 1,37 27 0,54 29 0,12 30 0,77 23 0,09  30 
FMG Global 0,20 27 0,07 27 0,18 27 1,60 23 1,39 26 0,88 25 0,26 27 0,58 26 0,18  27 
Interkraft Energy 0,89 18 0,36 18 0,77 18 2,43 18 1,93 18 2,19 18 1,50 18 1,51 17 1,05  17 
Nordic Alpha 1,06 15 0,43 15 0,93 15 2,79 13 2,17 15 2,65 13 1,88 15 1,83 12 1,32  15 
Sector Maritime 1,28 10 0,57   8 1,19 11 3,19 11 2,58 10 3,58   7 2,70 10 2,61   6 2,00    6 
WW Multi-Strat. 0,91 17 0,43 14 0,80 17 2,57 15 1,95 17 2,83 12 1,80 17 2,10 11 1,36  13 
WW Nordic Hedg 0,74 19 0,34 19 0,67 19 2,20 19 1,68 19 2,19 17 1,31 19 1,66 14 1,01  18 
WW Diversified 1,80   5 0,70   4 1,65   7 4,63   5 3,73   5 4,85   4 3,95   4 3,32   4 2,75    4 
Average 1,21 11 0,49 11 1,05 14 3,42   9 2,44 11 3,53   8 2,30 11 2,45   7 1,64  10 
Panel C: Stock Indices                
MSCI Emerg. M 1,16 13 0,44  13 1,25  10 2,63  14 2,33  12 2,25  16 1,90  14 1,57 16 1,34  14 
MSCI World 0,58 21 0,20  23 0,52  21 1,94  20 1,45  21 1,47  21 0,74  23 1,02 20 0,53  23 
MSCI Norway 1,09 14 0,41  17 1,25    9 2,49  17 2,25  14 2,14  19 1,85  16 1,37 18 1,20  16 
NASDAQ 0,05 31 0,02  31 0,05  31 1,22  30 1,03  31   0,43   30   0,07  31 0,31 30 0,05  31 
S&P 500 0,12 29 0,05  29 0,11 29 1,43  28 1,09  30 0,78  27  0,17 29 0,57 28 0,13  29 
Panel D: Commodity Index         
S&P GSCI 0,63 20 0,28  20 0,64  20 1,59  24 1,55  20 1,03  22 0,99  20 0,79 22 0,76  19 
Panel E: Bond Indices         
Lehm. Global Ag 0,54 22 0,22  22 0,51  22 1,57  25 1,44  23 0,95 23 0,81 22 0,67 24 0,61  22 
Lehm. US High Y 0,53 23 0,19  24 0,42  24 1,55  26 1,45  22 0,83 26 0,73 24 0,57 27 0,52  24 
 
Table 9: Annualized performance measurement for CS/Tremont Index, Norwegian funds and various indices. 
Omega, Kappa3 and Sortino is calculated for two different thresholds τ. T-bill is used as rf. The ranking of each 
fund according to the measures is given after the performance figures. Strategies for Norwegian funds: a = 
long/short equity, b = managed futures, c = multi-strategy and d = funds of funds. N = 50 
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Table 9 presents the results of different performance measures for the CS/Tremont index, 
individual Norwegian hedge funds and various traditional assets.  
 
10.4.1 CS/Tremont Indices 
Equity market neutral is the top ranked index also in this period, but not by all the measures. 
The modified Sharpe ratio and Kappa3 (τ = rf) rank Global Macro as number one and Equity 
Market Neutral as number two. All the measures rank Dedicated Short Bias last also in the 
shorter period. This period has been characterized by bull markets. Since the Dedicated Short 
Bias strategy is to sell short stocks in overvalued companies, this is a strategy which may 
perform poorly in bull markets.  
 
10.4.2 Individual Norwegian Hedge Funds 
By looking at table 9, it immediately appears as most of the Norwegian funds are ranked 
lower than the CS/Tremont indices. However, the picture changes when we compare the 
funds with the related strategy indices.  
 
WarrenWicklund Diversified is the Norwegian fund with the highest ranking. The ranking of 
this multi-strategy fund vary from 4 to 7. It is ranked higher than the Multi-Strategy index of 
CS/Tremont by all the measures. The other multi-strategy fund, WarrenWicklund Nordic 
Hedge, is ranked lower. The Long/Short Equity index of CS/Tremont is ranked in the range of 
11 to 15. Sector Maritime has outperformed this index with a ranking of 6 to 11, while 
Discovery and Nordic Alpha are both ranked lower. All the measures rank Interkraft Energy 
higher than the Managed Futures index of CS/Tremont. FMG Bio-Med and FMG Global are 
ranked poorest, also as compared to the traditional assets. The third Fund of Funds, 
WarrenWicklund Multi-Strategy, is ranked somewhat higher in the range of 12 to 17. 
 
To summarize, around half of the funds have performed better than their associated 
CS/Tremont indices. The other half have performed worse. The CS/Tremont indices and the 
Norwegian funds are overall ranked higher than the traditional assets. This indicates that the 
hedge funds have outperformed the market.  
 
Several factors may have influenced our results, and it is difficult to draw final conclusions. A 
potential error source is that the number of observations is low. The Norwegian hedge fund 
industry is young, and there are still relatively few Norwegian hedge funds in existence. In 
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order to get a sufficient number of funds to analyze, we had to limit the number of years to 
four. Hence, the individual Norwegian hedge funds studied are far from representative for the 
entire Norwegian hedge fund industry. A possible consequence of a relatively small data 
sample is that a few outliers can affect the results substantially. However, the data of the 
individual Norwegian hedge funds analysis can be more reliable than indices, since the 
indices are likely to be affected by various biases. 
 
10.4.3 Rank Correlation 
Table 10 shows Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for the different performance 
measures used. As we can see, they are highly correlated. This implies that the deviations 
between the rankings of the measurements are small and that the funds are ranked rather equal 
by the various measures. This is also consistent with the correlation of rankings found in 
chapter 9. 
 
Spearman's Rank Correlation 
January 2004 - February 2008 
  a b c d e f g h i 
Sharpe Ratio a 1                 
Modified Sharpe ratio b 0,990 1               
AR-adjusted Sharpe ratio c 0,988 0,973 1             
Omega t=0 d 0,968 0,968 0,949 1           
Omega t=rf e 0,995 0,987 0,984 0,977 1         
Sortino t=0 f 0,965 0,980 0,937 0,983 0,967 1       
Sortino t=rf g 0,993 0,995 0,977 0,975 0,991 0,976 1     
Kappa3 t=0 h 0,916 0,920 0,889 0,941 0,920 0,947 0,917 1   
Kappa3 t=rf i 0,958 0,958 0,937 0,937 0,951 0,945 0,956 0,968 1 
 
Table 10: Spearman’s rank correlation for the various performance measures of January 2004 to February 2008. 
Significance of the correlation coefficient is in bold. It is tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance 
level. N=122.  
 
10.5 Autocorrelation 
In table 11 and 12 we present the first order autocorrelation coefficients and the Ljung-Box 
Q(3) statistics for the CS/Tremont indices, the traditional assets and the Norwegian funds.  
 
10.5.1 CS/Tremont Indices 
Three of the CS/Tremont strategies; Convertible Arbitrage, Distressed and Multi-Strategy 
reveal a significant first order autocorrelation. These were also significant during the longer 
period, and as mentioned this is probably because they operate in illiquid markets. As for the 
 82
Ljung-Box test, four of the strategies reject the null-hypothesis. These are Convertible 
Arbitrage, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Global Macro and Multi-Strategy. Global Macro is the 
only index not showing autocorrelation also in the period of January 1998 to February 2007. 
Overall, there is less evidence of autocorrelation in the CS/Tremont returns in the shorter 
period as compared to the extended. Since autocorrelation point towards underestimation of 
volatility, the risk-adjusted performance measures are now more likely to be correct. The 
results are similar for the stock, commodity and bond indices. Only the bond index Lehman 
US High-Yield has significant first order autocorrelation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Table 11 b) 
 
Table 11 a)  
   
Table 11: Test of autocorrelation in the return series of the CS/Tremont indices (table 11 a))and of the various 
traditional assets (table 11 b)); panel A: Stock indices, panel B: Commodity indices and panel C: Bond indices. 
AR(1) is the first order autocorrelation of returns. Q(3) is the statistics of the Ljung-Box test. Significance are in 
bold at 1%* and 5% level. N=50. 
 
The shorter period is principally characterized by a bull market. If performance smoothing 
does exist, it might occur less in bull markets. Another reason could be that there has been a 
shift in the investment strategy of the hedge funds to more liquid and/or efficient markets. It is 
difficult to provide an exact reason to why there less autocorrelation in the indices during the 
shorter period. 
 
Traditional Asset Classes AR(1) Q3 
Panel A: Stock Indices  
MSCI Emerging Markets -0,07 1,10 
MSCI World 0,15 3,74 
MSCI Norway -0,13 2,66 
NASDAQ 0,07 4,89 
S&P 500  0,16 3,31 
Panel B: Commodity Index 
S&P GSCI -0,01 3,20 
Panel C: Bonds Indices 
Lehman Global Aggregate 0,07 0,8 
Lehman High-Yield 0,32 11,01 
CS/Tremont Index AR(1) Q3 
Convertible Arbitrage 0,50* 33,71* 
Dedicated Short Bias 0,16 4,04 
Emerging Markets -0,04 0,51 
Equity Market Neutral 0,22 5,84 
Event Driven 0,08 2,73 
        - Distressed 0,32 5,32 
        - Multi-Strategy -0,01 2,88 
        - Risk-Arbitrage 0,09 3,56 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0,24 14,96* 
Global Macro 0,22 9,54 
Long/Short Equity 0,12 3,78 
Managed Futures 0,16 6,85 
Multi-Strategy 0,32 8,3 
CS/Tremont Index 0,11 3,01 
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10.5.2 Individual Norwegian Hedge Funds 
None of the Norwegian hedge funds show a significant first order autocorrelation. Nordic 
Alpha is the only Norwegian fund which rejects the null hypothesis of the Ljung-Box test. 
This fund shows significant negative second order autocorrelation. The strategy of Nordic 
Alpha is long/short equity, and the fund could be operating in inefficient markets.  
 
Norwegian Hedge Funds AR(1) Q3 
Discovery                              0,24 6,22 
FMG Bio-Med                      -0,05 3,52 
FMG Global                          0,12 2,04 
Interkraft Energy                   0,18 3,84 
Nordic Alpha                        0,17 11,42* 
Sector Maritime                    0,09 3,13 
WW Diversified                    0,10 1,48 
WW MultiStrategy               0,15 3,19 
WW Nordic Hedge I             0,11 4,65 
Average  0,18 5,28 
 
Table 12: Autocorrelation coefficients of individual Norwegian hedge funds. AR(1) 
is the first order autocorrelation of returns. Q(3) is the statistics of the Ljung-Box 
test. Significance are in bold at 1%* and 5% level. N=50. 
 
According to Liang (2003), we could expect the autocorrelation to be stronger for individual 
funds than for style indices. This is because positive and negative autocorrelation may cancel 
each other out in indices. Our results indicate the opposite: we found more evidence of 
autocorrelation for the indices. It can be that the Norwegian funds operate in less illiquid 
markets. For instance, the managed futures fund, Interkraft Energy, invests heavily at Nord 
Pool. It is considered as a highly liquid market for electricity.  
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11.0 The Impact of Currency  
Since our analysis is from a US point of view, the individual Norwegian hedge funds were 
converted from Norwegian Kroner and Euro into US dollars. In this chapter we will discuss 
the main impact this had on our analysis. Appendix 10 and 11 shows the result of the 
summary statistics and performance measures of the Norwegian funds before we converted 
the returns. The only hedge funds already denoted in US dollars were FMG Global and FMG 
Bio-Med. 
 
The converted returns of the hedge funds were somewhat higher. Kroner and Euro have on 
average been strengthening against US dollars since 1998, hence this was expected. The 
standard deviation is also fairly higher.  
 
When considering skewness and kurtosis, we can also observe some differences. Skewness is 
more negative and kurtosis more positive before converting. Consequently, several of the 
hedge funds reject the Jarque-Bera test of a normal distribution, as compared to the converted. 
 
The tests of first order autocorrelation still remain insignificant for the Norwegian hedge 
funds before converting. The Ljung-Box Q(3) statistics is rejected for all except one, 
Discovery. When converted it is rejected for all but Nordic Alpha.  
 
The performance measures overall are somewhat higher for the converted hedge funds. An 
exception is the Omega measure at a threshold of zero. This is probably due to more returns 
centred about zero when not converted. However, the converted hedge funds show higher 
performance among both Sortino and Kappa3 at a threshold of zero. 
 
It can be argued that the higher performance among the hedge funds, when converted, is due 
to the weak dollar. From a US point of view, the situation would likely change if the US 
dollar would strengthen against the Norwegian Kroner and Euro.   
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12.0 Additional Remarks on Hedge Funds 
 
12.1 Potential Sources of Hedge Funds Performance   
Several researchers have tried to locate the potential sources of the superior performance of 
hedge funds as compared to the traditional asset classes. Based on this, we will discuss some 
aspects that might have affected hedge fund performance.  
 
 Incentive Fees 
The incentive fees of hedge funds are meant to encourage managers to increase performance.  
Ackerman et al. (1999) find that incentive fees explain some of the higher performance when 
analyzing hedge funds in the period of 1988 to 1995. This is supported by the research of the 
period 1990 to 1998 performed by Edwards and Caglayan (2001). They find that hedge funds 
with higher incentive fees have higher excess return than those with a lower incentive fee.   
 
 Manager Skills 
Since exploiting mispricing in the market is an important strategy of hedge funds, superior 
skills among the managers could perhaps be a source of the high performance found in our 
thesis. Brown et al. (1999) opposes this hypothesis, finding absolutely no evidence of 
differential skills among offshore hedge fund managers in the period of 1989-1995. On the 
other hand, Edwards and Caglayan (2001) find some evidence of management skills during 
the 1990’s by analyzing individual hedge funds. However, they do not exclude the possibility 
that this could be due to accident of history, because of the lack of more diverse markets. It is 
therefore difficult to draw definite conclusions about manager skills a role in the performance 
of hedge funds. 
 
 Performance Persistence 
Another aspect when we evaluate performance is that superior performance in the past does 
not necessarily mean superior performance in the future. Brown and Goetzmann (2003) find 
that persistence of fund returns depends on the particular style of management. Ackerman et 
al. (1999) found that hedge funds are unable to consistently beat the market.  
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12.2 Limitations 
Some of the positive performance may come from biases due to the difficulty of obtaining 
complete and correct information of hedge funds. Brown et al. (1999) describe survivorship 
bias as a result of either self selection or discontinuation. Discontinuation can be due to for 
instance liquidations, merges or restructures. They estimate it to be about 3 % per year for 
offshore hedge funds. Liang (2000) finds that survivorship bias exceeds 2 % per year when 
investigating two major databases, HFR and TASS. He also finds that poor performance is the 
main reason for funds’ disappearance. According to Amin and Kat (2003), survivorship bias 
creates a downward bias on the standard deviation and kurtosis, as well as an upward bias in 
skewness. Self-selection bias may also influence our analysis. For instance, there might be an 
upward bias towards well performing hedge funds in the database due to poor performing 
funds not reporting. However, this issue is complicated since data is difficult to obtain, and 
we can only mention the possibility for this bias to exist. The bias might as well be towards 
well-performing hedge funds not reporting to the database.  
 
In addition to these biases, investors’ perception of hedge fund performance varies among 
indices of the different databases (Brooks and Kat (2002)). Liang (2000) finds relatively few 
funds in common of various databases. Among the common funds, he finds significant 
differences in reported returns, net asset value, inception date, fee structures and investment 
styles. Based upon only one database, it is therefore almost impossible to draw conclusions 
regarding performance for the entire hedge fund universe. 
 
It is also essential to remember that hedge funds are not available to most people. Hedge 
funds generally target institutional investors and high net worth individuals, since the 
minimum investment required is too high for small investors. In addition, many are closed to 
new investments. The highly regarded manager of the Yale University endowment, David 
Swensen, has successfully used hedge funds in his investment strategy. His strategy is 
commonly referred to as the Yale model. Several financial institutions use his success as an 
argument for investing in hedge funds. However, Swensen does not agree that investing in 
hedge funds is necessarily the optimal solution for all investors. People in general do not have 
the capacity to select market-beating managers. Swensen argues that “the only people who 
should get involved are sophisticated individuals who have significant resources and a highly 
qualified investment staff” (New York Times (2008)).  
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13.0 Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis we have studied the characteristics and performance of hedge funds. This has 
been done to see if hedge funds do outperform the market as often believed. We have also 
studied the correlation of hedge funds with traditional assets, which indicates if diversification 
benefits do exist. The returns have also been adjusted for autocorrelation in order to see if it 
would affect our results. 
 
The summary statistics revealed that hedge funds overall have mean-variance characteristics 
superior to those of the traditional assets. By large, the individual Norwegian hedge funds 
have both higher mean return and standard deviation than the associated CS/Tremont indices, 
as expected since we compare indices with individual funds. The higher moments of the 
return distribution revealed negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis for the hedge 
funds. Since investors dislike negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis, hedge funds do 
not appear as attractive as they do at the first glance. These observations changed in the 
shorter period analysed, where a large part of both the indices and individual Norwegian 
hedge funds were normally distributed. This diverging result may be due to the different 
market conditions of the periods analysed. 
 
When analysing correlation, we found a low to medium correlation of hedge fund indices with 
the stock indices. However, overall the correlation seems to be somewhat lower in bear than 
bull markets. This could indicate that the benefits of diversification are lower than often 
claimed. Most of the indices were also correlated to the Lehman US High-Yield index in bear 
markets, possibly reflecting some credit exposure. The correlation of individual Norwegian 
hedge funds with traditional assets was overall lower as compared to the associated indices, 
and they might therefore serve well for portfolio diversification.  
 
By using various performance measures we ranked the indices and Norwegian hedge funds. 
Spearman’s rank correlation indicates a high correlation between the various performance 
measures. It may be that the choice of performance measure is less critical than often 
believed. Most of the hedge fund indices are ranked higher than the traditional indices. The 
results were the same for the shorter period. The measures ranked half of the Norwegian 
funds superior to the related CS/Tremont index.  
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There was evidence of autocorrelation in our findings during the extended period of our 
analysis. We also found presence of autocorrelation in the shorter period, but only for some 
indices. No first order autocorrelation in the return series was found for the individual 
Norwegian hedge funds. To see how the autocorrelation affected the hedge fund indices’ 
results in the extended period, we calculated the unsmoothed returns. The volatility increased 
for those revealing first order autocorrelation, and the values of performance measures 
decreased. Some of the indices with significant autocorrelation were ranked lower than 
before, but the ranking still favoured hedge fund indices. When measuring the correlation of 
hedge funds with traditional asset classes, we could see that the correlation increased for the 
indices exhibiting highest first order autocorrelation.  
 
We should be careful when interpreting our results. A problem when analyzing hedge funds is 
the presence of biases in the databases. Some of them are difficult to remove, like for instance 
the self-selection bias. There also exist evidence that the various databases have relative few 
hedge funds in common. Due to these biases, the hedge fund databases do not represent a 
complete random sample of the entire hedge fund universe. This is likely to affect our 
analysis. Lastly, it should be mentioned that hedge funds are not open to everyone, and  the 
minimum required investment is high.   
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The Central Bank of the United Kingdom: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/  
WarrenWicklund: http://www.warrenwicklund.no 
Yahoo! Finance: http://www.yahoo.com 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: A Brief Description of the Norwegian Hedge Funds 
 
Discovery Fund Plc.  
Strategy: Long/short equity.  
Focus on: Equities, interest bearing instruments and cash in the Nordic countries, with the 
possibility of diversifying in Europe.  
Registered in: Ireland 
 
FMG Bio-Med Hedge Fund Ltd 
Strategy: Fund of funds 
Focus on:  Fund managers related to the medical business. The portfolio is diversified 
between small and medium size managers. 
Registered in: Bermuda 
 
FMG Global Hedge Fund Ltd. 
Strategy: Fund of funds 
Focus on: The fund combines various global hedge strategies. The portfolio is diversified 
between different managers, with focus on USA, Europe and global multi managers. 
Registered in: Bermuda 
 
Interkraft Energy Fund  
Strategy: Managed futures 
Focus on: It trades in Nord Pool (Nordic power), the European Energy Exchange (German 
power) and the European Climate Exchange (CO2).  
Registered in: The Cayman Islands. 
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Nordic Alpha Plc  
Strategy: Long/short equity.  
Focus on: Equity and interest markets in the Nordic countries. The fund focuses on five core 
sectors in companies in oil and marine, pulp and paper, telecom, banking and consumer 
products. The investments will primarily be in small and medium capitalised issuers.  
Registered in: Ireland 
 
Sector Maritime Investment 
Strategy: Long/short equity 
Focus: The fund invests in selected shipping industries such as maritime transportation, ship 
yards, ship suppliers, cruise and ferry, as well as oil and gas services, exploration and 
production. 
Registered in: The Cayman Islands.   
 
WarrenWicklund Diversified Value 
Strategy: Multi-strategy 
Focus on: Invests in Nordic equities and Norwegian PCPs, a mixture between equity and 
bonds that are issued by Norwegian savings banks.  
Registered in: Norway* 
 
WarrenWicklund Multi-Strategy Fund 
Strategy: Fund of funds 
Focus on: Hedged equity, high yield and arbitrage styles. A minimum of 40% of the portfolio 
is managed by external managers, while 40% is invested by the WarrenWicklund Fourth 
Moment hedge fund in mixed arbitrage strategies. 
Registered in: Ireland 
 
WarrenWicklund Nordic Hedge I 
Strategy: Multi-strategy 
Focus on: Various strategies, but the fund mainly invests in strategies within arbitrage, 
hedged equity and high yield. 
Registered in: Norway* 
                                                 
*
 As it is a Norwegian registered fund, it is not allowed to utilize leverage or short single stocks. Hedging is 
therefore done through options on single stocks as well as option and futures on the various Nordic indices. 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics with the month of August 1998 Removed 
 
 
  Summary Statistics 
  Monthly Returns January 1998 – February 2008 
  Mean SD Min Max Skewn. Excess Jarque- 
  
          Kurtois Bera 
Convertible Arbitrage 0,75 1,28 -4,68 3,57 -1,15 2,97 79,71 
Dedicated Short Bias -0,19 4,62 -8,69 13,76 0,38 -0,18 3,43 
Emerging Markets 1,12 3,64 -9,78 15,34 -0,05 1,74 17,15 
Equity Market Neutral 0,86 0,75 -1,15 3,26 0,54 0,89 11,06 
Event Driven 1,01 1,28 -3,10 3,58 -0,81 1,24 23,50 
        - Distressed 1,09 1,35 -4,27 3,91 -0,76 1,94 34,43 
        - Multi-Strategy 0,98 1,50 -4,74 4,66 -0,52 1,81 24,72 
        - Risk-Arbitrage 0,64 1,13 -2,73 3,81 0,04 0,88 4,45 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0,47 1,07 -6,96 2,05 -3,22 17,83 2035,80 
Global Macro 1,24 2,71 -11,55 10,16 -0,07 4,99 141,46 
Long/Short Equity 1,14 2,78 -7,46 13,01 0,84 3,12 71,36 
Managed Futures 0,66 3,42 -8,62 8,63 -0,04 -0,35 0,73 
Multi-Strategy 0,79 1,10 -4,76 3,12 -1,09 4,14 123,97 
CS/Tremont Index 0,96 1,92 -4,63 8,53 0,74 2,69 53,42 
 
Summary statistics of monthly returns for CS/Tremont indices in the period if Jan. 98 to Feb. 08 when August 
1998 is removed. Numbers in bold are significant at a 1% level. N=122.  
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Appendix 3: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients of CS/Tremont with 
Traditional Assets 
 
Pearson's Correlation Coefficients  
 January 1998 – February 2008 
Lehm. Glob.  Lehm. US 
  
MSCI 
EM 
MSCI 
World NASDAQ 
S&P 
500 
S&P 
GSCI Aggregated High-Yield 
Panel A: CS/Tremont               
Convertible Arbitrage 0,19 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,04 -0,12 0,40 
Dedicated Short Bias     -0,71 -0,79 -0,81 -0,80 -0,06 0,03 -0,53 
Emerging Markets       0,83 0,63 0,57 0,56 0,19 -0,10 0,43 
Equity Market Neutral   0,36 0,36 0,22 0,34 0,10 0,07 0,15 
Event Driven          0,70 0,61 0,51 0,55 0,14 -0,14 0,58 
   - Distressed       0,63 0,57 0,48 0,54 0,08 -0,14 0,62 
   - Multi-Strategy     0,69 0,58 0,49 0,51 0,17 -0,15 0,50 
   - Risk Arbitrage 0,59 0,54 0,40 0,49 0,15 0,02 0,41 
 Fixed Income Arbitrage 0,08 0,01 0,01 -0,03 0,11 -0,03 0,26 
Global Macro 0,18 0,09 0,13 0,05 0,11 0,03 0,16 
 Long/Short Equity 0,66 0,65 0,74 0,58 0,20 0,04 0,38 
Managed Futures -0,06 -0,14 -0,18 -0,20 0,25 0,36 -0,16 
Multi-Strategy 0,31 0,32 0,31 0,24 0,13 0,08 0,41 
CS/Tremon Index 0,59 0,53 0,59 0,45 0,21 -0,01 0,42 
Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes           
MSCI Emerging Markets 1             
MSCI World 0,79 1           
NASDAQ 0,68 0,81 1         
S&P 500 0,72 0,96 0,82 1       
S&P GSCI 0,20 0,04 0,06 -0,02 1     
Lehman Global Aggr. -0,05 -0,02 -0,10 -0,10 0,16 1   
Lehman US High-Yield 0,53 0,52 0,49 0,51 -0,02 0,04 1 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies and traditional assets (Panel A). 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between traditional assets (Panel B). Significance is in bold, and tested with a 
two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. N=122 
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Appendix 4: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients in Bull and Bear Markets 
 
Spearman's  Correlation Coefficient in Bull Markets  
January 1998 - February 2008 
MSCI MSCI NASDAQ S&P S&P Leh.Glob Leh.US 
  World EM   500 GSCI Aggr. High-Yield 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Index            
CS/Tremont Index 0,29 0,27 0,15 0,09 0,22 0,05 0,02 
Convertible Arbitrage 0,22 0,14 0,21 0,15 0,00 0,02 0,20 
Dedicated Short Bias -0,52 -0,27 -0,64 -0,56 -0,04 0,02 -0,14 
 Emerging Markets 0,37 0,63 0,19 0,15 0,27 -0,05 0,16 
Equity Market Neutral 0,30 0,26 -0,01 0,18 0,15 0,21 -0,10 
Event Driven 0,37 0,46 0,29 0,20 0,07 -0,07 0,28 
   - Distressed 0,33 0,38 0,22 0,17 -0,07 -0,05 0,42 
   - Multi-Strategy 0,35 0,41 0,26 0,20 0,13 -0,07 0,17 
   - Risk Arbitrage 0,35 0,41 0,21 0,20 0,11 0,15 0,01 
 Fixed Income Arb. 0,24 0,24 0,16 0,14 0,19 0,24 0,24 
Global Macro 0,04 0,19 -0,01 -0,09 0,12 0,06 0,00 
 Long/Short Equity 0,36 0,27 0,37 0,27 0,26 0,04 -0,09 
Managed Futures 0,02 0,20 -0,14 -0,03 0,23 0,22 0,08 
Multi-Strategy 0,24 0,19 0,06 0,03 0,09 0,17 0,17 
Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes            
MSCI World 1             
MSCI emerging 0,52 1           
NASDAQ 0,52 0,30 1         
S&P 500 0,85 0,35 0,67 1       
S&P GSCI -0,08 0,11 -0,04 -0,17 1     
Lehm Global Agg. 0,00 -0,11 -0,21 -0,09 0,12 1   
Lehm US High-Yield -0,02 0,15 0,03 -0,05 -0,11 0,17 1 
 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies and traditional assets and 
between traditional assets in bull markets. Significance is in bold, and tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% 
significance level. N=122. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98
 
Spearman's Correlation Coefficient in Bear Markets  
January 1998 - February 2008 
MSCI MSCI NASDAQ S&P S&P Leh.Glob Leh. US 
  World EM   500 GSCI Aggr. High-Yield 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Indices            
CS/Tremont Index 0,36 0,57 0,43 0,24 0,17 0,16 0,49 
Convertible Arbitrage -0,19 -0,08 -0,11 -0,08 0,01 -0,20 0,45 
Dedicated Short Bias -0,49 -0,51 -0,64 -0,48 0,03 0,08 -0,41 
 Emerging Markets 0,43 0,82 0,51 0,35 0,09 -0,08 0,26 
Equity Market Neut. -0,07 -0,03 -0,14 -0,10 0,02 -0,13 0,00 
Event Driven 0,24 0,47 0,40 0,17 0,21 -0,06 0,47 
   - Distressed 0,22 0,39 0,42 0,20 0,12 -0,15 0,49 
   - Multi-Strategy 0,23 0,48 0,28 0,17 0,28 -0,05 0,44 
   - Risk Arbitrage 0,15 0,17 0,03 0,12 0,10 -0,03 0,29 
 Fixed Income Arb. -0,10 0,03 -0,09 -0,05 0,10 -0,01 0,33 
Global Macro -0,11 0,05 -0,11 -0,05 0,14 0,16 -0,01 
 Long/Short Equity 0,48 0,61 0,53 0,26 0,20 0,22 0,42 
Managed Futures -0,34 -0,26 -0,29 -0,43 0,29 0,35 -0,29 
Multi-Strategy 0,08 0,12 -0,03 -0,06 0,12 0,04 0,34 
Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes         
  
MSCI World 1             
MSCI emerging 0,57 1           
NASDAQ 0,72 0,56 1         
S&P 500 0,83 0,42 0,74 1       
S&P GSCI 0,02 0,22 -0,01 -0,18 1     
Lehm. Global Agg. -0,06 -0,09 -0,19 -0,31 0,19 1   
Lehm.US High-Yield 0,33 0,29 0,32 0,39 0,00 0,07 1 
 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies and traditional assets and 
between traditional assets in bear markets. Significance is in bold, and tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% 
significance level. N=122 
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Appendix 5: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients in Bull and Bear Markets 
 
 
Pearson's Correlation Coefficient in Bull Markets  
January 1998 - February 2008 
MSCI  MSCI  NASDAQ S&P S&P  Leh.Glob  Leh. US 
  
 World  EM   500 GSCI Aggr. High-Yield 
Panel A: CS/Tremont               
CS/Tremont Index 0,07 0,20 0,34 -0,11 0,20 -0,11 0,12 
Convertible Arbitrage 0,06 0,07 0,13 -0,03 -0,01 -0,03 0,29 
Dedicated Short Bias -0,53 -0,24 -0,65 -0,52 0,01 -0,03 -0,15 
 Emerging Markets 0,30 0,66 0,20 0,04 0,21 -0,16 0,15 
Equity Market Neutral 0,30 0,28 0,01 0,24 0,09 0,18 -0,07 
Event Driven 0,28 0,43 0,18 0,02 -0,01 -0,17 0,33 
   - Distressed 0,24 0,30 0,14 0,04 -0,08 -0,10 0,51 
   - Multi-Strategy 0,23 0,40 0,20 -0,01 0,02 -0,22 0,16 
   - Risk Arbitrage 0,32 0,46 0,15 0,15 0,10 0,12 0,04 
 Fixed Income Arb. -0,10 0,07 0,01 -0,20 0,14 0,01 0,30 
Global Macro -0,08 0,08 0,09 -0,19 0,08 -0,09 0,18 
 Long/Short Equity 0,20 0,21 0,55 0,06 0,22 -0,04 -0,05 
Managed Futures -0,09 0,12 -0,23 -0,14 0,21 0,29 0,02 
Multi-Strategy -0,01 0,07 0,09 -0,12 0,07 0,16 0,28 
Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes            
  
MSCI World 1             
MSCI emerging 0,45 1           
NASDAQ 0,44 0,22 1         
S&P 500 0,87 0,29 0,50 1       
S&P GSCI -0,13 0,12 0,02 -0,18 1     
Lehman Global Agg. 0,02 -0,09 -0,17 -0,04 0,13 1   
Lehman US High-Yield 0,00 0,22 0,14 -0,02 -0,17 0,13 1 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies and traditional assets and between 
traditional assets in bull markets. Significance is in bold, and tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance 
level. N=122. 
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Pearson's Correlation Coefficient in Bear Markets  
January 1998 – February 2008 
MSCI MSCI NASDAQ S&P S&P Leh.Glob Leh.US 
  World EM   500 GSCI Aggr. High-Yield 
 Panel A: CS/Tremont               
CS/Tremont Index 0,52 0,71 0,51 0,45 0,20 0,11 0,44 
Convertible Arb. 0,10 0,17 0,03 0,16 0,07 -0,23 0,46 
Ded. Short Bias -0,61 -0,67 -0,65 -0,64 -0,03 0,13 -0,48 
 Emerging Markets 0,57 0,86 0,52 0,55 0,15 -0,09 0,36 
Equity Market Neut. 0,10 0,15 -0,01 0,10 0,07 -0,10 0,09 
Event Driven 0,57 0,71 0,40 0,55 0,23 -0,18 0,55 
   - Distressed 0,55 0,65 0,43 0,55 0,13 -0,22 0,57 
   - Multi-Strategy 0,55 0,72 0,36 0,51 0,28 -0,15 0,52 
   - Risk Arbitrage 0,47 0,50 0,23 0,44 0,17 -0,09 0,47 
 Fixed Income Arb.. 0,17 0,15 -0,01 0,17 0,06 -0,14 0,31 
Global Macro 0,07 0,21 -0,02 0,07 0,15 0,23 0,02 
 Long/Short Equity 0,58 0,74 0,61 0,49 0,17 0,12 0,40 
Managed Futures -0,51 -0,37 -0,39 -0,58 0,28 0,42 -0,41 
Multi-Strategy 0,01 0,08 -0,02 -0,10 0,17 -0,05 0,31 
 Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes  
MSCI World 1             
MSCI emerging 0,71 1           
NASDAQ 0,74 0,61 1         
S&P 500 0,93 0,62 0,77 1       
S&P GSCI 0,06 0,26 -0,01 -0,08 1     
Lehm. Global Agg. -0,15 -0,08 -0,15 -0,32 0,20 1   
Lehm.US High-Yield 0,49 0,43 0,39 0,50 0,04 -0,05 1 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies and traditional assets and between 
traditional assets in bear markets. Significance is in bold, and tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance 
level. N=122 
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 Appendix 6: Unsmoothed Summary Statistics for CS/Tremont 
 
 
  Summary Statistics 
  Monthly Returns January 1998 – February 2008 
  Mean SD Min Max Skewn. Excess Jarque- AR(1) Q3 
  
          Kurtois Bera     
Panel A: CS/Tremont         
Convertible Arbitrage 0,64 2,47 -10,01 9,07 -0,82 3,99 94,91* -0,03 3,17 
Dedicated Short Bias -0,06 5,73 -10,29 25,35 0,96 2,33 46,19* 0,01 0,52 
Emerging Markets 0,79 5,17 -29,95 17,15 -1,80 10,24 599,24* 0,01 1,10 
Equity Market Neutral 0,80 0,90 -1,20 3,19 0,35 -0,37 3,22 0,01 0,61 
Event Driven 0,83 2,35 -16,92 4,15 -3,77 25,95 3710,64* -0,01 0,34 
        - Distressed 0,90 2,42 -17,53 5,74 -3,82 27,54 4152,35* -0,02 0,43 
        - Multi-Strategy 0,80 2,54 -16,08 5,89 -2,51 15,37 1328,94* -0,02 0,87 
        - Risk-Arbitrage 0,56 1,71 -8,30 5,42 -0,89 6,11 205,69* 0,03 2,32 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0,40 1,62 -8,79 6,37 -1,59 9,76 535,80* 0,07 4,31 
Global Macro 0,97 3,12 -13,59 13,32 -0,48 5,70 169,79* 0,00 0,42 
Long/Short Equity 0,96 3,43 -13,30 13,74 0,13 4,07 84,33* 0,00 0,19 
Managed Futures 0,72 3,96 -10,23 11,43 -0,02 -0,17 0,16 0,02 3,68 
Multi-Strategy 0,73 1,37 -6,15 3,70 -1,21 4,66 139,89* 0,01 0,70 
CS/Tremont Index 0,75 2,13 -8,60 8,97 -0,07 4,82 118,19* 0,07 1,48 
Panel B: Stock Indices               
MSCI Emerging Markets 0,94 7,73 -32,59 14,71 -0,94 1,97 38,74* 0,00 0,26 
MSCI World 0,41 4,51 -14,88 9,69 -0,58 0,69 9,59* 0,01 1,69 
NASDAQ 0,56 8,52 -24,30 22,50 -0,22 0,64 3,17 0,00 0,02 
S&P 500 0,27 4,41 -16,21 9,58 -0,65 1,10 15,07* 0,01 1,48 
Panel C: Commodity Index               
S&P GSCI  0,89 6,43 -14,41 16,89 0,08 -0,40 0,98 0,03 6,12 
Panel D: Bond Indices                 
Lehman Global 0,53 1,79 -4,43 5,63 0,11 0,22 0,50 0,02 4,66 
Lehman US High Yield 0,44 2,47 -8,58 8,47 -0,47 2,94 49,64* 0,01 1,70 
Summary statistics of monthly unsmoothed returns in the period from January 1998 to February 2008. Panel A: 
CS/Tremont, panel B: Stock indices, panel C: Commodity index and panel D: Bond indices. AR(1) is the first 
order autocorrelation of returns. Q(3) is the statistics of the Ljung-Box test. Significance are in bold at 1%*  
N=122. 
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Appendix 7: Unsmoothed Performance Measures for CS/Tremont 
 
 
Unsmoothed Annualized Performance Measurement 
January 1998 – February 2008  
Sharpe  Mod. AR Adj. Omega  Sortino Kappa3 
  Ratio SR SR τ=0 τ=rf τ=0 τ=rf τ=0 τ=rf 
Panel A: CS/Tremont  
      
          
Convertible Arb. 0,50  10 0,18 13 0,51   10 2,08 11 1,52  10 1,36 11 0,71 11 0,86 10 0,46  12 
Ded. Short Bias -0,21 21 -0,13 21 -0,20   21 0,97 21 0,86  21 -0,05 21 -0,31 21 -0,04 21 -0,25  21 
Emerging Markets 0,34 15 0,11 15 0,34   15 1,54 15 1,32  14 0,71 17 0,45  15 0,42 17 0,26  15 
Equity Market Neut. 2,02   1  0,76   1 1,99     1 12,86   1 5,00    1 13,83   1 5,78    1 8,86   1 3,94    1 
Event Driven 0,80   4 0,21   8 0,80     4 2,82   4 1,99    4 1,61   9 1,01    7 0,82  12 0,52    8 
        - Distressed 0,88   3 0,23   6 0,89     3 3,09   3 2,20    3 1,72   8 1,12    6 0,86   9 0,57    7 
         - Multi-Strat. 0,70   7 0,19 10 0,71     6 2,47   7 1,80    7 1,54 10 0,94    8 0,82 11 0,51    9 
        - Risk-Arb. 0,57   9 0,19 11 0,55     9 2,43   8 1,62    9 1,72   7 0,85    9 1,06   7 0,50  10 
Fixed Income Arb. 0,25 16 0,08 17 0,24   16 2,60   6 1,24  16 1,87   5 0,33  16 1,07   6 0,20  17 
Global Macro 0,76   5 0,27   5 0,76     5 2,06 12 1,90    5 1,22 12 1,16     4 0,71 14 0,71    5 
Long/Short Equity 0,69   8 0,28   4 0,69     8 2,24   9 1,76    8 1,74   6 1,14    5 1,08   5 0,72    4 
Managed Futures 0,38 13 0,18  12 0,38   13 1,57 14 1,32  15 1,05 13 0,60   13 0,78 13 0,45  13 
Multi-Strategy 1,13   2 0,36    2 1,11    2 4,09   2 2,40    2 3,24   2 1,74     2 1,86   2 1,05    2 
CS/Tremont Index 0,75   6 0,28    3 0,71    7 2,76   5 1,86    6 2,18   3 1,22    3 1,30   4 0,75    3 
Panel B: Stock Indices 
        
MSCI EM 0,38  14 0,15 14 0,38   14 1,46  17 1,32  13 0,72 16 0,52  14 0,48  16 0,35  14 
MSCI World 0,12  19 0,05 19 0,12   19 1,29  18 1,10  19 0,48 18 0,17  19 0,34  18 0,12  19 
NASDAQ 0,14  18 0,07 18 0,14   18 1,22  19 1,12  18 0,38 18 0,20  18 0,27  19 0,15  18 
S&P500 -0,02  20 -0,01 20 -0,02   20 1,16  20 0,98  20 0,28 20 -0,03  20 0,19  20 -0,02  20 
Panel C: Commodity Index 
                
S&P GSCI 0,40  12 0,19   9 0,39   12 1,48  16 1,33  12 0,92 14 0,63  12 0,92    8 0,49  11 
Panel D: Bond Indices 
                 
Leh. Global Aggr. 0,48  11 0,22   7 0,48   11 2,13  10 1,42  11 1,91   4 0,78  10 1,38    3 0,58    6 
Leh. US High-Yield 0,21  17 0,09 16 0,21   17 1,61  13 1,19  17 0,91 15 0,30  17 0,61  15 0,20  16 
 
Unsmoothed annualized performance measurement for CS/Tremont indices and various indices. Omega, Kappa3 
and Sortino is calculated for two different thresholds τ. T-bill is used as rf. The ranking of each fund is marked in 
red. N = 122. 
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Appendix 8: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients for Unsmoothed Returns 
 
Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients for Unsmoothed Returns  
 January 1998 – February 2008 
Lehm.Glob.  Lehm. US 
  
MSCI 
EM 
MSCI 
World NASDAQ 
S&P 
500 
S&P 
GSCI Aggr. High-Yield 
Panel A: CS/Tremont Indices              
Convertible Arbitrage 0,21 0,21 0,19 0,17 0,04 -0,01 0,46 
Dedicated Short Bias     -0,66 -0,80 -0,83 -0,80 -0,06 0,00 -0,53 
Emerging Markets       0,84 0,68 0,57 0,58 0,17 -0,01 0,38 
Equity Market Neutral   0,36 0,40 0,20 0,33 0,12 0,07 0,11 
Event Driven          0,70 0,66 0,65 0,58 0,16 0,00 0,56 
   - Distressed       0,56 0,56 0,59 0,52 0,09 -0,03 0,59 
   - Multi-Strategy     0,70 0,63 0,60 0,56 0,16 -0,03 0,46 
   - Risk Arbitrage 0,51 0,47 0,41 0,41 0,13 0,15 0,31 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0,20 0,19 0,18 0,15 0,15 0,13 0,30 
Global Macro 0,26 0,18 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,07 0,11 
Long/Short Equity 0,69 0,76 0,71 0,68 0,22 0,09 0,43 
Managed Futures 0,11 0,05 -0,03 0,00 0,26 0,27 0,00 
Multi-Strategy 0,44 0,50 0,39 0,41 0,10 0,14 0,43 
CS/Tremon Index 0,64 0,65 0,59 0,56 0,20 0,06 0,46 
Panel B: Traditional Indices             
MSCI Emerging Markets 1             
MSCI World 0,78 1           
NASDAQ 0,68 0,83 1         
S&P 500 0,70 0,95 0,86 1       
S&P GSCI 0,16 0,03 0,03 -0,07 1     
Lehman Global Aggr. -0,06 0,01 -0,14 -0,09 0,19 1   
Lehman US High-Yield 0,41 0,45 0,45 0,46 -0,03 0,11 1 
 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients for unsmoothed returns between CS/Tremont hedge fund strategies and 
traditional assets (Panel A). Spearman’s correlation coefficients for unsmoothed returns between traditional 
assets (Panel B). Significance is in bold, and tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. N=122 
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Appendix 9: Correlation of Norwegian Hedge Funds with Traditional 
Assets 
 
 
Spearman’s rank correlation of individual Norwegian Hedge funds with traditional assets using Spearman’s rank 
correlation. Panel A: CS/Tremont and Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes. Significance is in bold, and tested with 
a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. N=50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation of  Norwegian Hedge Funds with Traditional Assets 
January 2004 - February 2008 
MSCI MSCI  MSCI  NASDAQ S&P  S&P Lehm.  Lehm.US  
  EM Norway World   500 GSCI Glob Agg High-Yield 
Panel A: CS/Tremont                
Discovery 0,40 0,35 0,46 0,29 0,33 0,08 0,43 0,23 
Interkraft 0,18 0,21 0,25 0,18 0,17 0,07 0,36 0,20 
Sector Maritime 0,36 0,44 0,32 0,01 0,10 0,37 0,29 0,13 
WW Diversified 0,45 0,41 0,51 0,37 0,36 0,12 0,16 0,31 
WW MultiStrategy 0,39 0,39 0,34 0,14 0,12 0,24 0,50 0,02 
WW Nordic Hedge 0,41 0,43 0,39 0,24 0,22 0,29 0,33 0,11 
Nordic Alpha 0,37 0,34 0,45 0,35 0,33 0,14 0,34 0,26 
FMG Bio-Med 0,25 0,29 0,36 0,37 0,34 -0,01 -0,14 0,31 
FMG Global 0,75 0,63 0,81 0,59 0,64 0,12 -0,07 0,30 
Average 0,50 0,49 0,55 0,35 0,36 0,20 0,36 0,28 
Panel B: Traditional Asset Classes  
      
  
    
MSCI EM 1               
MSCI Norway 0,71 1             
MSCI World 0,78 0,64 1           
NASDAQ 0,54 0,41 0,81 1         
S&P500 0,57 0,44 0,89 0,89 1       
S&P GSCI 0,26 0,47 0.00 -0,15 -0,23 1     
Leh.Global Agg. 0,18 0,15 0,08 -0,06 -0,05 0,12 1   
Leh.High-Yield 0,38 0,36 0,58 0,55 0,65 -0,02 0,22 1 
 105
Appendix 10: Summary Statistics of Norwegian Funds before Converting 
Summary Statistics  
Monthly Return January 2004 - February 2008 
  
  
  
  Mean SD Min Max Skewn. 
Excess 
Kurt. 
Jarque-
Bera AR(1) Q(3) 
Discovery                               0,28 1,52 -4,44 4,97 0,32 2,72 16,25* 0,16 9,65 
FMG Bio-Med                      0,33 2,15 -6,48 4,19 -0,76 0,79 6,17 -0,05 3,52 
FMG Global                          0,40 2,16 -8,00 3,05 -1,49 3,33 41,70* 0,12 2,04 
Interkraft Energy                   0,66 2,40 -9,42 5,66 -1,21 5,56 76,79* 0,10 4,95 
Nordic Alpha                        0,77 1,95 -6,89 4,44 -1,12 4,22 47,70* 0,02 2,12 
Sector Maritime                    1,18 2,61 -4,94 6,93 0,07 0,11 0,07 0,16 2,22 
WW Diversified                    1,62 2,91 -7,45 7,46 -0,61 0,94 4,95 0,13 0,97 
WW MultiStrategy               0,51 0,92 -1,35 2,80 0,01 -0,25 0,14 0,01 2,40 
WW Nordic Hedge I              0,37 1,46 -6,03 4,23 -1,34 7,35 127,59* 0,14 2,60 
Average  0,68 1,34 -4,95 2,70 -1,45 4,97 69,01* 0,14 4,79 
 
Summery statistics of monthly returns in the period from January 2004 to February 2008. Significant number 
are bold at 1%* and 5% level. AR(1) is the first order autocorrelation of returns. Q(3) is the statistics of the 
Ljung-Box test. N=50. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 11: Performance Measurement of Norwegian Funds before 
Converting 
 
Annualized Performance Measurement 
January 2004 – February 2008 
Sharpe  Mod. AR Adj. Omega  Sortino Kappa3 
  Ratio SR SR τ=0 τ=rf τ=0 τ=rf τ=0 τ=rf 
Discovery Fund 0,01 0,00 0,01 1,72 1,40 1,10 0,01 0,73 0,01 
FMG Bio-Med 0,09 0,04 0,10 1,47 1,37 0,54 0,12 0,77 0,09 
FMG Global 0,20 0,07 0,18 1,60 1,39 0,88 0,26 0,58 0,18 
Interkraft Energy 0,56 0,19 0,56 2,24 1,55 1,44 0,79 0,86 0,48 
Nordic Alpha 0,88 0,29 0,88 3,09 1,62 2,19 1,33 1,32 0,83 
Sector Maritime 1,20 0,51 1,20 3,41 1,62 3,40 2,43 2,30 1,68 
WW Multi-Strategy 1,90 0,00 1,90 3,83 1,48 4,45 1,49 3,25 1,14 
WW Nordic Hedge 0,23 0,08 0,23 2,12 1,49 1,29 0,32 0,76 0,20 
WW Diversified 1,60 0,57 1,60 4,01 1,67 3,77 3,00 2,45 1,98 
Average 1,04 0,33 1,04 3,86 1,60 2,95 1,63 1,70 0,98 
 
Annualized performance measurement for CS/Tremont Index, Norwegian funds and various indices before 
converting returns into dollars. Omega, Kappa3 and Sortino is calculated for two different thresholds τ. T-bill is 
used as rf. N=50. 
